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Thesis

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DATA FOR A  
PERSONALISTIC ONTOLOGY COLLECTED FROM AUGUSTINE'S  
CONFESSIONS

by

Samuel Young

(A.B., Northwest Nazarene College - Eastern Nazarene College)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts

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Psychological and Philosophical Data for a  
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## INTRODUCTION

1. Giving some estimates of the influence of Augustine upon Christian thought.

The limits of this brief paper cluster around one of the brightest stars among the thinkers of antiquity. His ideas have moving power and every student of the history of thought has felt their grip, sooner or later, directly or indirectly.

This outstanding thinker was essentially a religious genius, so much so that opposing schools of thought alike claim him as the father of their faith. Schaff declares, <sup>1</sup>"All the church fathers are, indeed, the common inheritance of both parties," (referring to Catholics and Protestants) "but no other of them has produced so permanent effects on both, and no other stands in so high regard with both as Augustine." It is this Augustine of the fourth and fifth centuries (354-430) who now engages our attention and study.

Every church historian of note speaks of him in the superlative degree. <sup>2</sup>"Calvin quotes him, as he says, 'more frequently than any other as the best and most faithful writer of antiquity'." Pusey ventures that he was <sup>3</sup>"perhaps the most powerful mind of Christian antiquity". Eucken characterizes him as <sup>4</sup>"one of the few personalities from whom later ages draw inspiration, and who serve as a lodestar in the solution of

1. Schaff, P. History of the Christian Church, Vol. III, p. 1016.

2. Insitut. IV, XIV, 26. Quoted in History of Christian Doctrine, by George P. Fisher, p. 176.

3. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E. B. Pusey, p. xvii.

4. Eucken, Rudolph. The Problem of Human Life, p. 248.







of those eternal problems which transcend all ages". Cleveland refers to him as <sup>1</sup>"the man to whom nothing of man is alien". Bertrand declares, <sup>2</sup>"The Western soul is marked with the stamp of his soul". Osmun observes that, <sup>3</sup>"There is a silent pressure of his power felt in every period of the history of the Church and of Christian doctrine". Harnack is bold to call him <sup>4</sup>"the first modern man", and declares, <sup>5</sup>"He took religion - a transfigured and molded monachism, dominated by positive conceptions and trust in Christ - out of its congregational and ritualistic form, and set it in the hearts of individuals as a gift and a task .... But above all and in all, he exhibited to every soul its glory and its responsibility: God and the soul, the soul and its God".

## 2. The proposed task of this paper.

In recent years, Knudson estimates that <sup>6</sup>"Augustine might in a small sense be called the first personalist", and it is the pursuit of this thought, presented to us first by Dr. George C. Cell, (professor of Church History in Boston University School of Theology) that we present the following survey. Dr. Cell reminds us that, <sup>7</sup>"In the last analysis, the personalistic philosophy is the slow, age-long deposit of Christian thought and ~~it fell~~ <sup>feeling</sup> on the soil of the Occident." Our proposed task then is to trace something of Augustine's contribution to this philosophy and to show that he had, for the most part, the

1. Augustine, A. The Soliloquies. Rose E. Cleveland, p. xvi.
2. Bertrand, L. Saint Augustine, p. 4.
3. Osmun, George W. Augustine, the Thinker, p. 242.
4. Harnack, Adolph. History of Dogma. Quoting from Siebeck, Vol. V, footnote, p. 409.
5. Ibid., p. 65.
6. Knudson, Albert D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 429.
7. Cell, George C. Seminar on History of American Thought.



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1. Augustine, The City of God, Book 2, Cleveland, p. 171.
2. Bernard Williams, The Western World, p. 4.
3. James O. Carter, The Western World, p. 118.
4. Bernard Williams, The Western World, p. 118.
5. Bernard Williams, The Western World, p. 118.
6. Bernard Williams, The Western World, p. 118.
7. Giff, George D., Church History, p. 118.
8. Giff, George D., Church History, p. 118.



essential germinal thoughts that make for a personalistic ontology. However, it is only fair to observe here that the personalistic interpretation of Augustine's thought is only one of a variety that may be found in him.

### 3. The leading sources used.

The writings of Augustine were so prolific that we are forced of necessity to limit the source work of this paper, so we have turned to the most fruitful field of available data (at the suggestion of Dr. Cell) i.e., to The Confessions. We have followed certain leads given in various foot notes of the works consulted. We have found Harnack's History of Dogma, especially volume five, to be quite rich in suggestive material. This we have used freely.

Also, in delineating the special earmarks of personalism we have followed rather closely the outline in Dean Knudson's Philosophy of Personalism. This book we have found to be fruitful in suggestive references and ideas regarding Augustine's contribution to the development of ~~the~~ personalistic mode of thought. We have endeavored to measure Augustine somewhat by Dean Knudson's outline of personalism in both the field of epistemology and metaphysics.

Of course no consideration of personalism would be adequate unless we dipped into the writings of the first outstanding personalist, namely, the works of Borden Parker Bowne. This we have done, and have also endeavored to keep Bowne's views of personalism throughout as the criterion for the present inquiry.



essential personal thoughts that make for a personalistic philosophy. However, it is only fair to observe that the personalistic investigation of Kantianism's thought is only one of a variety that may be found in the

### 3. The Idealist movement

The writings of Kantianism were so prolific that we are forced at necessity to limit the scope work of this paper, so we have turned to the most typical field of available data for the suggestion of Dr. Bell, i.e., to The Idealism. We have followed certain leads given in various foot notes of the work consulted. We have found Kantian's History of Ideas, especially values like, to be rich in suggestive material. This we have used freely.

Also, in delineating the special character of person-

alism we have followed rather closely the outline in Person Kantian's History of Ideas. This book we have found to be fruitful in suggestive references and ideas relating to Kantian's contribution to the development of the personalistic mode of thought. We have endeavored to measure Kantian's account by Jean Kantian's outline of personalism in both the field of epistemology and metaphysics.

Of course no consideration of personalism would be adequate unless we dipped into the writings of the first outstanding personalist, namely, the work of Herman Lotze. This we have done, and have also endeavored to keep Kantian's views of personalism throughout as the criterion for the present inquiry.



It naturally will be impossible for us to give credit to Dr. Cell for all the references he has pointed out ~~and~~ the ideas suggested in class and seminar. However, we would not infer that the foregoing is an exact or representative construction of Dr. Cell's insights, nor would we imply that he is in any way responsible for the conclusions suggested from the references given.

4. Some qualifying statements regarding Augustine and his writings.

At the outset we would hasten to admit the constant danger that confronts the reader of the versatile pen of Augustine; that is, that of interpreting him in the light of one's own thoughts on the subject discussed. There is so much to be found in Augustine that it almost literally true that one may find in him just what he is looking for. But where an occasional reader may construct a single truth out of whole cloth to support his own peculiar system of ideas, the vast majority will pass by frequent and penetrating insights that have been engulfed in the mazes of the bishop's meandering rhetoric.

Writing from his own philosophic viewpoint Eucken observes: <sup>1</sup>"To define Augustine's historical position is by no means easy. Obviously he forms the intellectual culmination

1. Eucken, Rudolph. The Problem of Human Life, p. 247.







of early Christianity and dominates the Middle Ages. But later Christianity has constantly drawn from him, and the Reformation in its main theses appealed to his authority; indeed it is scarcely a paradox to say that if the present generation means to take up the fundamental problems of religion, and to take them up independently, it must go back for its historic orientation, not to Schliermacher or Kant, not to Luther or Thomas, but to Augustine, as the point where all later developments were in the formative stage, and where, accordingly, their justification or non-justification will be evident to critical examination. Moreover, aside from religion, the modern thinker will find many points of contact with Augustine, if only he penetrates beneath the often curious expression of the thought to the essence of the matter." It is our purpose in this paper to show that beneath the form of multitudinous theological expressions found in Augustine, he was essentially personalistic in his philosophy. That is, if we view him in the light of his writings which were written in the epoch of his maturity, namely, through The Confessions, On the Trinity and the like.

Augustine has been frequently charged with inconsistencies. He seems to take positions that for the logical and systematic thinker are mutually exclusive. It appears to us that he never carefully harmonized his ideas and writings, and it is quite premature to look for any systematic personalism in his works. This was a much later development. Dean Knudson has pointed out that, <sup>1</sup>" It is to Borden P. Bowne that we



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son has pointed out that, "It is to Bodin, however, that we



owe what may be called SYSTEMATIC METHODOLOGICAL PERSONALISM.

It was he who first took the personalistic conception of reality, grounded it in Kantian epistemology, developed its implications in a comprehensive way, and made it the center and constitutive principle of a complete metaphysical system." But withal, the essential elements of a personalistic ontology are to be found in Augustine, despite the fact that he frequently did not develop the implications of his own insights. As Eucken puts it, <sup>1</sup>"He merely followed his own genius, and in so doing develops an imperishable greatness."

Harnack declares that Augustine furnished the church with many conflicting ideas that eventually resulted in violent controversies. He avers that Augustine <sup>2</sup>"GAVE IT (the church) IMPULSES AND PROBLEMS BUT NOT A SOLID CAPITAL". Harnack continues, <sup>3</sup>"It is one of Renter's chief merits that he has proved the impossibility of constructing a system from Augustine's thought, and of removing the inconsistencies that occur in it."

<sup>4</sup>Dean Knudson also points out that at times Augustine's philosophy is deterministic, precluding a genuine freedom for personality. And again, <sup>5</sup>that his Absolute idealism frequently seems to embrace all finite existence refusing to admit anything "other" to or separate from the Absolute. Thus Augustine's piety intermingles with his philosophy and a serious adjustment is never made.

It is also evident that Augustine never completely

1. Eucken, Rudolph. The Problem of Human Life, p. 248.
2. Harnack, Adolph. History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 98.
3. Ibid., footnote, p. 102.
4. Knudson, Albert D. THE Philosophy of Personalism, p. 34.
5. loc. cit.



one what may be called *epistemological personalism*.  
 It was he who first took the *epistemological* concept of  
 reality, grounded it in Kantian epistemology, developed its  
 implications in a comprehensive way, and made it the center  
 and constitutive principle of a complete metaphysical system.  
 But what, the essential elements of a personalistic ontology  
 are to be found in Hegel's, despite the fact that he fre-  
 quently did not develop the implications of his own insights.  
 In Hegel's case it, I think, merely followed his own genius, and  
 in no sense developed an inevitable process.  
 Hegel's doctrine that *Being* is the *substance* of the world  
 with many conflicting ideas that eventually resulted in violent  
 contradictions. He says that *Being* is *substance* (the *substance*)  
*substance* and *process* but not a *substance*. Hegel con-  
 tinues, "It is one of Hegel's chief merits that he has  
 proved the impossibility of constructing a system from *sub-  
 stance* alone, and of removing the inconsistencies that occur  
 in it."  
 Hegel's answer also points out that at times *sub-  
 stance* is *substance*, including a *substance* free-  
 dom for *substance*. And again, "What his Absolute Idealism  
 presently seems to embrace is *substance* existing *sub-  
 stance* to or separate from the Absolute. Thus  
 Hegel's *substance* is *substance* with its philosophy and a  
 serious adjustment is never made.

1. Hegel, *Philosophy of Human Mind*, p. 243.  
 2. Hegel, *Philosophy of Human Mind*, Vol. V, p. 24.  
 3. Hegel, *Philosophy of Human Mind*, p. 107.  
 4. Hegel, *Philosophy of Human Mind*, p. 24.  
 5. Hegel, *Philosophy of Human Mind*, p. 24.



It is also evident that Augustine never completely freed himself from the philosophic forms of his day, and that some of his theology is "polluted by philosophical rationalizations" current in his times. Dr. Cell observes that <sup>1</sup>"Augustine was an empiricist in practice, but not in theory." Like others, <sup>2</sup>"Augustine does not wholly escape the faults of his age - he was part of it." We are left then, <sup>3</sup>"to press forward to the living whole of Augustine's personality in order to find a bond of union underlying the manifold elements, and rendering their contradictions intelligible." But withal let us remember that <sup>4</sup>"this personality cannot be brought within the limits of formal logic". In many respects Augustine's peculiarities are his strength and sometimes his inconsistencies are also shrieking testimonies to the wealth and content of his thought. Eucken concludes, <sup>5</sup>"Yet, however much we may find to criticise, if we follow Augustine's self-revelations to their source, they always disclose a genuine human and wholly intelligible aspiration; they reveal a man of integrity, a powerful man, and one to whom nothing human is foreign."

1. Cell, George O. Seminar on Augustine.

2. Augustine, A. The Confessions of Augustine. W. T. G. Shedd, p. xxxii.

3. Eucken, Rudolph. The Problem of Human Life, p. 214.

4. loc. cit.

5. Ibid., p. 215.



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1. Cell, George E. Sermon on Augustine.
2. Augustine, A. The Confessions of Augustine. W. T. G. Stedman.
3. Asken, Rudolph. The Problem of Human Life, p. 216.
4. Ibid., p. 216.
5. Ibid., p. 216.



## I. AUGUSTINE'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

### A. The Problem Outlined.

Dean Knudson has pointed out the four essential elements to personalism's epistemology in his Philosophy of Personalism. These are: (1) the dualism of thought and thing, or idea and object; (2) the creative activity of thought; (3) the trustworthiness of reason; and (4) the primacy of the practical reason. For the sake of convenience we have adopted this formula in studying Augustine's theory of knowledge.

Dean Knudson also reminds us that <sup>1</sup>"Augustine fails to distinguish truth as a general concept and truth as objectively real. For him 'to be true is the same as to be'. The idea of Truth implies its reality." And yet, the way to reality had a vital hold on Augustine's thought as manifested in his writings. In the opening chapter of The Confessions he prays, <sup>2</sup>"Grant me Lord, to know and understand which is first, to call on Thee or to praise Thee? and, again, to know Thee or to call on Thee? For who can call on Thee, not knowing Thee? For he that knoweth Thee not, may call on Thee as other than Thou art. Or, is it rather, that we call on Thee that we may know Thee?" Again read him as he exclaims, <sup>3</sup>"Perish every thing, dismiss we these empty vanities, and betake ourselves to the one search

1. Knudson, Albert D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 266.

2. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E. B. Pusey. I, 1.

3. Ibid., V, 11.



A. The Problem of Truth

When Augustine has pointed out the four elements of knowledge as personalism's epistemology in his Philosophy of Personality, these are: (1) the function of thought and thing; or idea and object; (2) the creative activity of thought; (3) the trustworthiness of reason; and (4) the primacy of the practical reason. For the sake of convenience we have adopted this formula in studying Augustine's theory of knowledge.

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for truth!" It seems incredible that one so eager to find the ultimately real could ignore the pathways that led to that inward satisfaction. However, it is well to note here that epistemology for Augustine has only relative importance, namely, as it leads to metaphysics. His philosophy then is predominantly metaphysical. In this respect too, he is genuinely <sup>1</sup>personalistic in his emphasis. Augustine was not one that was guilty of spending all of his time in sharpening his axe - he had wood to chop. It seems to us that Augustine was so keenly aware of the parallelism existing between truth and reality, and their mutual interests, that at times he appears to identify epistemology and metaphysics. This parallelism itself is readily accepted by the leaders of personalistic thought, but of course without the Augustinian identity.

### 1. Dualism of thought and thing.

Personalism is essentially dualistic in its epistemology. But, as Dean Knudson puts it, <sup>2</sup>"It is not the disparity between the experienced object and the real object that makes an epistemology dualistic, but their mutual otherness."

Augustine suggests this "otherness" in the words, <sup>3</sup>"They wish then to hear me confess what I am within; whither neither their eye, nor ear, nor understanding, can reach; they wish it, as ready to believe - but will they know?" The impenetrable depths of reality implied in that subtle turn of thought to a question mark, seems to point to the unique "otherness"

1. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 168.

2. Ibid., p. 103.

3. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B.Pusey, X, 3.



for himself. It seems to me that one no longer is free to  
 arbitrarily feel and know the difference that led to that  
 and satisfaction. However, it is well to note that this  
 tendency to "relativism" has only relative importance, namely, as  
 it leads to relativism. His philosophy then is relativistic.  
 Relativistic. In this respect, he is fundamentally  
 relativistic in his attitude. Relativism has not one that is really  
 of experience all of his time in philosophical life - he has used  
 to object. It seems to me that this is the only sense of  
 the word which exists between truth and reality, or their  
 actual interests, that is, which he appears to identify with  
 along with relativism. His relativistic theory is really  
 accepted by the leaders of relativistic thought, but of course  
 without the relativistic theory.

### 1. Relative of thought and being.

Relativism is an attitude which is the opposite  
 of it. But, as I have said it, it is not the opposite  
 between the organized object and the real object that makes  
 of "relativistic" thought, but their actual differences.  
 Relativistic experience is "otherness" in the world.  
 "Otherness" is then to be as content what I am thinking; what  
 neither thought, nor act, nor relationship, can reach; they  
 are ready to believe - but will they never? The inter-  
 esting degree of reality implied in that which is not thought  
 is a question which seems to point to the "otherness".



between idea and object. In the same vein he writes, <sup>1</sup>"But their ear is not at my heart, where I am, whatever I am". That "whatever I am" suggests an underlying agreement with <sup>2</sup>Lotze's description of reality as a precipitate whose genesis we can never grasp. Similarly, Dean Knudson observes: <sup>3</sup>"What reality is, the human mind does not predetermine. It is something revealed to us through sensations and perceptions. We do not make it, we find it .... Reality is thus something other than our thought of it. Indeed, it is something deeper and richer than all thought.... The world is not mere idea; it is idea translated into deed. How this translation takes place we do not know."

In his psychological analysis of memory Augustine delineates between idea and object. <sup>4</sup>"I name a bodily pain, yet it is not present with me, when nothing aches: yet unless its image were present to my memory, I should not know what to say thereof, nor in discoursing discern pain from pleasure." It is this ability to discern or distinguish through differences that gives him an intelligent view of the world about him. In the language of Bowne, <sup>5</sup>"Objects only become objects as they are differenced from one another."

Again Augustine writes: <sup>6</sup>"All these (referring to light, sounds, smells, etc.) doth the great harbor of the memory receive in her numberless secret and inexpressible windings, to be forthcoming and brought out at need; each entering

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E. B. Pusey. X, 3.
2. Quoted by Knudson, Albert D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 106.
3. Knudson, Albert D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 106.
4. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E. B. Pusey. X, 15.
5. Bowne, Borden P. Ulrici's Logic. The New Englander, XXXIII, (1874), p. 465.
6. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E. B. Pusey. X, 8.



between these and objects. In the same vein he writes, "I am  
that which is not at my heart, where I am, whatever I am". "What  
"whatever I am" suggests an underlying agreement with "I am"  
description of reality as a pre-constituted whole. Genuine we can  
never grasp. Similarly, when I am an object, "What reality  
is, the human mind does not pre-constitute. It is something re-  
vealed to us through sensations and perceptions. We do not  
make it, we find it. . . . Reality is thus something other than  
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1. Augustine, The Confessions, B. E. Percy, trans., 1945.  
2. Ibid., The City of God, B. E. Percy, trans., 1945.  
3. Augustine, The City of God, B. E. Percy, trans., 1945.  
4. Augustine, The City of God, B. E. Percy, trans., 1945.  
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6. Augustine, The City of God, B. E. Percy, trans., 1945.  
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9. Augustine, The City of God, B. E. Percy, trans., 1945.  
10. Augustine, The City of God, B. E. Percy, trans., 1945.



in by his own gate, and there laid up. <sup>1</sup>Nor yet do the things themselves enter in; only the images of the things perceived are there in readiness, for thought to recall."

Likewise, <sup>2</sup>"The self as known stands opposed to the self as knower.... The idea by which the self apprehends itself is not identical with the self. The idea of the self is itself a thought product." This seems to be the drive of Augustine when he queries, <sup>3</sup>"For whence does a mind know another mind, if it does not know itself?.... As the mind, then, itself gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so of incorporeal things through itself. Therefore it knows itself also through itself, since it is incorporeal; for <sup>if</sup> it does not know itself, it does not love itself."

And again: <sup>4</sup>"For even while I dwell in darkness and silence in my memory I can produce colors, if I will, and discern between black and white, and what others I will: nor yet do sounds break in, and disturb the image drawn in by my eyes, which I am reviewing, though they also are there, lying dormant and laid up, as it were, apart .... These things do I within, in that vast court of my memory: For there are present with me, heaven, earth, sea, and whatever I could think on therein, besides what I have forgotten." Thus Augustine would emphasize the distinction between subject and object by differentiating between the mind itself and its feelings,

1. Underscoring is mine. S. Y.

2. Knudson, Albert D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 111.

3. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III. On the Trinity, IX, 3.

4. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E. B. Pusey. X, 8.



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1. Augustine is mine, S. Y.  
2. Augustine, Albert C. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 111.  
3. Schmitt, E. Heidegger and Kant-Heidegger, Vol. III, Ch.  
the Existential, IX, 3.  
4. The Confessions, E. S. Tracy, p. 8.



thoughts and activities. He would seem to say in agreement with personalism<sup>that</sup> the self is deeper than any one or all of its activities.

In seeking for the ultimately real Augustine never identifies God with his own thought. There is a gulf fixed that only faith can leap. This is the attitude of his soul when he declares, <sup>1</sup>"And thus with the flash of one trembling glance it arrived at THAT WHICH IS." It was this "flash" that made<sup>possible</sup> the translation, heretofore impracticable to lumbering thought.

## 2. The creative activity of thought.

The question as to how experience is made possible is held by <sup>2</sup>Bowne to be one of epochal significance. Then he adds, <sup>3</sup>"Kant's answer is well known. Experience is not something given ready-made from without, but is actively constructed by the mind within. Experience is possible only through a certain constitutive mental activity, according to the principles immanent in the understanding. In this way the raw materials of sense impressions, which in themselves are fleeting and discontinuous, ~~is~~ built into a rational world of experience." <sup>Then</sup> Bowne concludes with emphasis, <sup>4</sup> "This insight was Kant's great contribution to philosophy, and it remains, in spite of all criticism, a permanent possession of reflective thought."

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E. B. Pusey. X, 8.

2. Bowne, Borden P. Personalism, p. 56.

3. loc. cit.

4. loc. cit.



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#### The creative activity of thought.

The question as to how experience is made possible is  
held by Kant to be one of special significance. Then he  
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is concerned with epistemology. "This insight was Kant's great  
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1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, Ch. X, B.
2. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B. 26.
3. loc. cit.
4. loc. cit.



This Kantian idea of the creative activity of thought is a vital part of Bowne's epistemology. The same idea (though but in germ) is to be found in Augustine's philosophy. Here, however, as in other instances, the thought is left in "a state of arrested development", and its logical implications are largely overlooked.

Referring to the unifying and self-directing agency of the mind in a psychological analysis of memory, Augustine writes: <sup>1</sup>"There also I meet with myself, and when, where, and what I have done, and under what feelings .... Out of the same store do I myself with the past continually combine fresh and fresh likenesses of things which I have experienced, have believed." Thus sensations, images and perceptions are constructed for the mind itself and as such are the products of thought activity. Another citation: <sup>2</sup>"For who would willingly speak thereof, if so oft as we name grief or fear, we should be compelled to be sad or fearful? And yet could we not speak of them, did we not find in our memory, not only the sounds of the names according to the images impressed by the senses of the body, but notions of the very thing themselves which we never received by any avenue of the body, but which the mind itself perceiving by the experience of its own passions, committed to the memory."

The mind is certainly not <sup>here</sup> the passive recipient

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E. B. Pusey, X, 8.
2. Ibid., X, 14.



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The mind is certainly not the passive recipient



of external stimuli, according to Augustine: it is an active agent that makes its own pictures. <sup>1</sup>"For even while I dwell in darkness and silence in my memory I can produce colors, if I will, and discern between black and white, and what others I will: nor yet do sounds break in, and disturb the image drawn in by my eyes, which I am reviewing, though they also are there, lying dormant and laid up, as it were, apart."

Augustine also tries to account for error through the creative activity of thought. He writes: <sup>2</sup>"But because the mind has great power to imagine not only things forgotten, but also things that it never saw, or experienced, either by increasing, or diminishing or changing or compounding, after its pleasure, those which have not dropped out of its remembrance, it often imagines things to be such as either it knows they are not, or does not know that they are."

We readily admit that Augustine does not show clearly that sensations themselves are thought-products, but he does suggest something of their inarticulate state without the active mind. <sup>3</sup>"As the mind, then, itself gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so of incorporeal things through itself."

Memory is for Augustine the wealthy and expansive storehouse of the mind whose doors open and close largely at the behest of the will. <sup>4</sup>"When I enter there, I require what

- 1.. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E. B. Pusey X, 8.
2. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III. On the Trinity, XI, 5.
3. Ibid., IX, 3.
4. Augustine, A. loc, cit.



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1. Augustine, *The Confessions*, B. N. Tracy, trans.,  
 2. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III.  
 On the Trinity, ch. vi.  
 3. Ibid., ix, 3.  
 4. Augustine, A. loc. cit.



I will, to be brought forth, and something instantly comes; others must be longer sought after, which are fetched, as it were, out of some inner receptacle; others rush out in troops, and while one thing is desired and required, they start forth, as who should say, 'Is it perchance I?' These I drive away with the hand of my heart, from the face of my remembrance; until what I wished for be unveiled, and appear in sight, out of its secret place." Consciousness thus becomes for Augustine a living stream dominated by the unifying active mind at the control of the will.

### 3. The trustworthiness of reason.

Personalism has a high degree of confidence in the self-sufficiency of reason, but at the same time it avoids the egotism of rationalism<sup>and skepticism</sup>. Bowne repeatedly pointed out that there was no conclusion other than solipsism for the confirmed skeptic.

Augustine gives us a glimpse of his own emancipation from skepticism when he writes concerning his first great work, Contra Academicos: <sup>1</sup>"Whatever be the value of those treatises what I most rejoice in is, not that I have vanquished the Academicians, as you express it (using the language rather of friendly partiality than of truth), but that I have broken and cast away from me the odious bonds by which I was kept back from the nourishing breasts of philosophy,

1. Augustine, A. Letters I, 3. Quoted in The Soliloquies. Rose E. Cleveland, footnote 24, p. 132.







through despair of attaining that truth which is the food of the soul." Bowne also declares:<sup>1</sup>"Whatever mystery attaches to the process of knowledge and whatever verbal doubts may be raised about it, the knowledge vindicates itself within its own sphere by the clearness of our apprehension and by its consistency in experience." In the same mood Augustine writes: <sup>2</sup>"As regards the uncertainty about everything which Varro alleges to be the differentiating characteristic of the New Academy, the City of God thoroughly detests such doubts as madness. Regarding matters which it apprehends by the mind and reason it has most absolute certainty although its knowledge is limited.... It believes also the evidence of the senses which the mind uses by aid of the body; for (if one who trusts his senses is sometimes deceived), he is more wretchedly deceived who fancies he should never trust them." There is thus a ~~validity~~ about personal knowledge that is trustworthy for Augustine.

But the natural limits of the human mind are not ignored by this thorough-going philosopher. He writes, <sup>3</sup>"For fairer is the modesty of a candid mind than the knowledge of those things which I desired." Similarly, <sup>4</sup>"And that mind is more praiseworthy which knows even its own weakness, than that which, without regard to this, the ways of the stars, or which holds fast such knowledge already acquired, while ignorant

1. Bowne, B. P. Personalism, p. 80 .
2. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. II, The City of God, XIX, 18.
3. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E.B.Pusey, V, 7.
4. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III, On the Trinity, IV, 1.



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1. Bowne, A. A. Personalism, p. 80.  
2. Johns Hopkins and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. II, The  
City of God, XII, 17.  
3. Augustine, A. The Confessions, V, 7.  
4. Johns Hopkins and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III,  
On the Trinity, IV, 1.



of the way by which itself to enter into its own proper health and strength." Such quotations as these seem to us to put out Augustine forever from the school of extreme rationalists in which he is so often placed.

Dean Knudson points out<sup>1</sup> that while it is true that we must as rational beings assume the validity of reason, he reminds us that this assumption is itself a matter of faith, and that to accept reason, quite as much as to reject it is at bottom an act of volition. There seems to be a similar inference made in Augustine's remarkable quotation:  
<sup>2</sup>"And consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know." Reason and reality are both inwardly certain but without any logical rationalization.

Schaff also observes concerning Augustine's thought that,<sup>3</sup>"He always asserted, indeed, the primacy of faith, according to his maxim: FIDES PRAECEDIT INTELLECTUM; appealing, with theologians before him, to the well-known passage of Isaiah 7:9 (in the LXX): 'NISI CREDIDERITIS, NON INTELLIGETIS'. But to him faith itself was an acting of reason, and from faith to knowledge, therefore, there was a necessary transition."

As we have already pointed out (p. 9), Augustine makes much of the parallelism between truth and reality, so that to accuse him of questioning the fundamental validity of

1. Knudson, Albert D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 143-4.
2. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. II, The City of God, XI, 26.
3. Ibid., Vol. I, Prolegomena, p. 74



of the way by which I feel to enter into its own proper health and strength. Such questions as these seem to us to put out Augustine's theory from the school of extreme rationalists in which he is so often placed.

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Schaff also observes concerning Augustine's thought that "He always asserted, indeed, the primacy of faith, according to his maxim: *FIDES PRÆCIPIT INTELLECTUM*; appealing, with theologians before him, to the well-known passage of Isaiah 7:9 (in the LXX): *QUI CREDIDERIT, NON INDEBITUR GENTIS*. But to him faith itself was an act of reason, and from faith to knowledge, therefore, there was a necessary transition."

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I. Robinson, *Albert D. The Philosophy of Testimony*, p. 128-9.  
 E. Schaff, *St. Augustine and the Christian Fathers*, Vol. II, The City of God, XI, 28.  
 E. Schaff, Vol. I, Prolegomena, p. 71.



reason would be equivalent to assuming his skepticism concerning reality itself; for he writes, - <sup>1</sup>"that seems to me to be true which is." And again, "All things are true so far as they be; nor is there any falsehood, unless when that is thought to be which is not."

#### 4. The primacy of the practical reason.

Without a doubt personalism is voluntaristic rather than rationalistic. <sup>2</sup>"It lays more stress on the will than the intellect and inclines to the view that life is deeper than logic." This was Bowne's position constantly. We find him referring to <sup>3</sup>"the fanatical logician" and voicing a certain distrust for those who would measure all truth by the canon of consistency alone. He avers: <sup>4</sup>"Man is life rather than reason, and reason only strives to formulate what life and reality are." Again he writes: <sup>5</sup>"If a man were not will, as well as understanding, his system of belief would be different." So he concludes, <sup>6</sup>"It is the will rather than the understanding which declares the case closed."

Augustine seems to recognize this cognitive function of the will when he writes: <sup>7</sup>"Teach me, Thou, how to come to Thee! I have nothing other than the will! I know nothing other than that the fleeting and the falling should be spurned, the fixed and eternal sought after."

1. Augustine, A. The Soliloquies, Rose E. Cleveland, p. 65.

2. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 67.

3. Bowne, B. P. Studies in Theism, p. 64.

4. Ibid., p. 74.

5. Bowne, B. P. Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 380.

6. loc. cit.

7. Augustine, A. op. cit. p. 8.



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#### 4. The primacy of the practical reason.

Without a doubt personalism is voluntaristic rather than rationalistic. "It lays more stress on the will than the intellect and inclines to the view that life is deeper than logic." This was Bonhoeffer's position consistently. We find him referring to "the practical intellect" and voicing a certain distrust for those who would measure all truth by the canon of consistency alone. He writes: "Life is life rather than reason, and reason only strives to formulate that life and reality are." Again he writes: "If a man were not will, as well as understanding, his system of belief would be different." So he concludes, "It is the will rather than the understanding which decides the case closed."

Avastine seems to recognize this cognitive function of the will when he writes: "Teach me, Thou, how to come to Thee! I have nothing other than the will! I know nothing other than that the fleeting and the falling should be embraced, the fixed and eternal sought after."

1. Introduction, The Philosophy of Bonhoeffer, p. 15.
2. Introduction, The Philosophy of Bonhoeffer, p. 17.
3. Introduction, The Philosophy of Bonhoeffer, p. 18.
4. Introduction, The Philosophy of Bonhoeffer, p. 19.
5. Introduction, The Philosophy of Bonhoeffer, p. 20.
6. Introduction, The Philosophy of Bonhoeffer, p. 21.
7. Introduction, The Philosophy of Bonhoeffer, p. 22.



In the above quotation the idea of value or worth is also introduced. Certain ideas should be spurned as worthless ("the fleeting and the falling should be spurned"), that the valuable and ideal may be realized, ("the fixed and eternal sought after").

In his arguments with the Manichaeans Augustine points out clearly how emotion and will enter into the thinking and conclusions of even his rationalistic opponents. This he does by citing his own experience in the Manichaean Order. <sup>1</sup>"Whence it resulted that whatever they said, as if affected by certain strange disorders, I approved <sup>not because I knew it to be true,</sup> of as true, but because I wished it to be. So it came about that, however slowly and cautiously, yet for a long time I followed men that preferred a sleek (shining) straw to a living soul."

In his emancipation from Manichaean philosophy, Augustine again points out the place of will and emotion in reaching a spiritual view of reality. <sup>2</sup>"Being led, however, from this to prefer the Catholic doctrine, I felt that her proceeding was more unassuming and honest, in that she required to be believed things not demonstrated, .... whereas among the Manichees our credulity was mocked by a promise of certain knowledge, and then so many most fabulous and absurd things were imposed to be believed, because

1. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. IV, Against the Manichaeans, IX.

2. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E. B. Pusey, VI, 5.



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points out clearly how emotion and will enter into the thinking and conclusions of even the rationalistic opposition. This he does by citing his own experience in the Argentine. In 1930 he was in the Argentine when they said, as it often happens, certain strange things, I was not because I knew it to be true. So it came about that, however slowly and gradually, yet for a long time I followed him that preferred a place (thinking) away to a living one."

In his argument with the *Wissenschaften* Argentine again points out the place of will and emotion in reaching a spiritual view of reality. "Being led, however, from this to prefer the Catholic doctrine, I felt that my reasoning was more unassuming and honest, in that she required to be believed things not demonstrated.... whereas among the *Wissenschaften* our credulity was rooted by a promise of certain knowledge, and then so many most elaborate and absurd things were imposed to be believed, because



they could not be demonstrated.

In the same vein, concerning the same struggle for reality, he writes, <sup>1</sup>"And I did in my inmost soul believe that Thou were incorruptible, and uninjurable, and unchangeable; because though not knowing whence or how, yet I saw plainly and was sure, that that which may be corrupted, must be inferior to that which cannot; what could <sup>not</sup> be injured I preferred unhesitatingly to what could receive injury; the unchangeable to things subject to change." In this quotation the expressions, "must be inferior" and "I preferred unhesitatingly", are again indicative of the place of <sup>2</sup>value judgments in Augustine's epistemology. He uses the same approach to reality in the following: <sup>3</sup>"But since most truly and certainly, the incorruptible is preferable to the corruptible, (as I did now prefer it,)) then, wert Thou not incorruptible, I could in the thought have arrived at something better than my God. When then I saw the incorruptible to be preferable to the corruptible, there ought I to seek for Thee, and there observe wherein evil itself was!" The validity of will and emotion for cognitive purposes is thus affirmed fairly definitely. Siebeck observes in studying Augustine in this regard: <sup>4</sup>"Even the powers of the intellect are looked at from a new point of view, owing to the influence exerted on them by the heart and will, and they lose, in consequence, their claim to sole supremacy in scientific

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E.B. Pusey, VII, 1.

2. The place of value judgments is so vital to Augustine's thought of God that we have given it further consideration on page .

3. Augustine, A. loc. cit., VII, 4.

4. Siebeck, Quoted by Harnack, Adolph. History of Dogma, V, p. 107-8.







thought." And thus the supreme decision does not rest ultimately on reason but on <sup>1</sup>"the irresistible force of the internal."

Truth to Augustine is something that has an inward certainty. He asks, <sup>2</sup>"Will you affirm that to be false which with a strong voice Truth tells me in my inner ear, concerning the Eternity of the Creator, that His substance is in no ways changed by time, nor His will separate from His substance?" Frequently Augustine speaks of his <sup>3</sup>"inner ear" as descriptive of an intuitive certainty of the soul. This thought is not far removed from the language of Bowne written to Professor Cell: <sup>4</sup>"Any knowledge of reality must finally rest on some important intuition of which no further account can be given." Reality is thus ultimately based on personal experience. Compare this with the following experience related in Augustine's autobiography: <sup>5</sup>"And thus with the flash of one trembling glance it arrived at That Which Is and then I saw Thy invisible things understood by the things which are made."

Bowne also declares that, <sup>6</sup>"The great fundamental, and abiding feelings of the race prove much". He believed that our total subjective, abiding feelings were reliable index fingers <sup>to reality</sup> when the ensuing results were basic and permanent. Augustine makes a similar appeal to race experience when he declares, <sup>7</sup>"It is no vain and empty thing, that the

1. Siebeck, Quoted by Harnack, A. History of Dogma, V, p. 107-8.
2. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E. B. Pusey, XI, 15.
3. loc. cit.
4. Cell, George C. Lectures on History of American Thought, class room notes.
5. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E. B. Pusey, VII, 17.
6. Bowne, B. P. Studies in Theism, p. 65.
7. Augustine, A. op. cit. VI, 115.



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1. Stobaeus, quoted by H. W. B. E. A. History of Rome, V, p. 107-8.
2. Augustine, A. The Confessions, A. N. H. W. p. 11, 12.
3. See, also, p. 11, 12.
4. Bell, George B. Lectures on History of American Thought.
5. Augustine, A. The Confessions, A. N. H. W. p. 11, 12.
6. Hume, D. H. H. W. p. 11, 12.
7. Augustine, A. The Confessions, A. N. H. W. p. 11, 12.



excellent dignity of the authority of the Christian Faith hath overspread to the whole world." Here Augustine would say that the Christian ideal is universally practicable because of its present general acceptance, and these practical results are arguments in favor of its validity.

In Augustine's personal struggle for spiritual emancipation he points out that his bondage lay not in the understanding, but in the will. Having learned of the open confession of faith on the part of his renowned friend, Victorinus, Augustine admits that he <sup>1</sup>"was on fire to imitate him"; but lacked the will. <sup>2</sup>"My will the enemy held, and thence had made a chain for me, and bound me." He seems to sense the fact that he held the key in his own hands for his release when he cries out to his friend Alypius, <sup>3</sup>"What ails us? what is it? What heardest thou?" The unlearned start up and take heaven by force, and we with our learning, and without heart, lo, where we wallow in flesh and blood! Are we ashamed to follow, because others are gone before, and not ashamed not even to follow?" The "heart" that they lacked was the will to believe and the will to abandon their evil habits.

Faith is a practical necessity to all knowledge according to personalism. <sup>4</sup>"Knowledge, before it can become a rounded system, must call in the category of purpose, a principle borrowed from the practical reason; and so also at its

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E. B. Pusey, VIII, 5.

2. loc. cit.

3. Ibid., VIII, 8.

4. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 162.







very inception, in its most elementary forms, it requires as its presupposition an act of faith, which likewise is rooted in the practical reason." Dean Knudson further explains,  
<sup>1</sup>"Faith is primarily an act of volition. It springs out of the vital needs and interests of the mind."

This practical necessity as the starting place of all knowledge of reality is evident even in Augustine's intellectual wanderings. <sup>2</sup>"This I believed, sometimes more strongly, more weakly other-whiles; yet I ever believed both that Thou wert, and hadst a care of us; though I was ignorant, both what was to be thought of Thy substance, and what way led or led back to Thee." It is evident then that before Augustine was convinced of the spiritual nature of reality, and before he had learned that the approach to reality was through personality, he saw the practical necessity of faith as the ground work in building any philosophy involving reality. Shedd observes,  
<sup>3</sup>"His (Augustine's) speculation issues from his religious life and feeling, and helps both to clarify and deepen it. In other words, Augustine is here practising upon his own celebrated dictum, that faith precedes scientific knowledge. The practical belief of the truths of Christianity contains much that is latent and undeveloped. The Christian is wiser than he knows." Faith is thus a practical postulate.

The compelling force of the universal needs and

1. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 162.
2. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E. B. Pusey, VI, 5.
3. Augustine, A. The Confession of Augustine, Wm. T. G. Shedd, p. xii.



very important, in its most elementary forms, it requires the presupposition of faith, which likewise is rooted in the practical reason. "Doxo-episteme further explains, 'Faith is primarily an act of volition. It brings out of the vital needs and interests of the mind.'

This practical necessity of the starting place of all knowledge of reality is evident even in Augustine's intellectual wanderings. "This I believed, sometimes more strongly, more weakly other-when; yet I ever believed that that way was and what a care of me; though I was ignorant, both what was to be thought of the substance, and what way led on and back to that." It is evident that before Augustine was convinced of the spiritual nature of reality, and before he had learned that the approach to reality was through personality, he saw the practical necessity of faith as the ground-work in writing any philosophy involving reality. He had of course, Augustine's) conception issues from his religious life and feeling, and helps both to clarify and deepen it. In other words, Augustine is here practicing upon his own deluded mind, that faith precedes scientific knowledge. The practical belief of the truth of Christianity contained within that is latent and unexpressed. The Christian is wiser than he knows. Faith is thus a practical postulate.

The compelling force of the universal needs and



Desires of heart and mind are constantly evidenced in Augustine. He writes, <sup>1</sup>"And I said, 'Is Truth therefore nothing because it ~~is~~ not diffused through space finite or infinite?' And Thou criedst to me from afar; 'Yea, verily, I AM that I AM'. And I heard, as the heart heareth, nor had I room to doubt, and I should sooner doubt that I live, than that Truth is not, 'which is clearly seen being understood by those things which are made'." The intellectual explanation of reality is lost in difficulty and mystery, but from the view of the facts of life, both internal and external, it has a fixed certainty that is as real as personal life. Again we read: <sup>2</sup>"For this very thing was of all most to be believed, since no contentiousness of blasphemous questionings, of all that multitude which I read in the self-contradicting philosophers, could wring this belief from me, 'That Thou art whatsoever Thouwert,' (what I knew not,) and 'The the government of human things belongs to Thee'." Thus to ignore the ground of reality and man's intimate relationship to that ground was for Augustine a practical absurdity that he could not be persuaded to embrace even during the foggy days of skepticism. This agrees substantially with personalism's position as stated by Bowne; <sup>3</sup>"Man is will, conscience, aspiration, and these are far ~~from~~ more powerful factors than the logical understanding."

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, VII, 10.

2. Ibid., VI, 5.

3. Bowne, B.P. Personalism, p. 376.







## II METAPHYSICS ACCORDING TO AUGUSTINE

### A. The Problem Outlined

As we have already observed, personalism is essentially a ~~philosophy of~~ metaphysics. It is not content to go hunting only to receive the thrill of carrying a gun and tramping the woods; it must bring home the "game". In keeping with this thought Bowne observes: <sup>1</sup>"In addition we must note that our knowing in its very nature implies being in the sense of a content which is the object of the knowing. Knowing as an act never ends itself as a psychological fact." Similarly nothing short of reality itself is an adequate goal for the Bishop of Hippo. In his classic expression of the abiding desire of his mind and heart Augustine opens wide the door to his philosophy of life: <sup>2</sup>"I desire to know God and the soul." And when catechised by Reason, "And nothing more?", his ready answer is, "Nothing whatever". Ultimate reality as expressed in the infinite and finite personality are thus the goal of all his intellectual pursuits. In keeping with this Bowne declares, <sup>3</sup>"Apart from the finite spirit, the only reality is God, and his progressively unfolding plan and purpose and work." Our method of viewing Augustine's theory of reality will be similar to the one previously adopted in studying his epistemology. We shall use (for the most part) the ready-made outline of Dean Knudson's historical analysis of personalism in which he delineates the constitutive elements of its meta-

1. Bowne, B. P. Personalism, p. 60.

2. Augustine, A. The Soliloquies. R.E. Cleveland, p. 10.

3. Bowne, B.P. Op. cit., p. 157.



A. The Personal Aspect

As we have already observed, personalism is essentially a philosophical position. It is not content to no question only to receive the truth of something, but to grasp the truth; it must bring about the truth. In keeping with this, the personalist observes that the truth must not be that the truth is the very nature of things, but in the sense of a content which is the object of the knowing. Knowing is an act never ended, as a psychological fact. Similarly, nothing about the truth itself is an absolute fact for the knowing of it. In this sense, the expression of the abiding desire of the mind and heart suggests again with the best to his philosophy of life: "I desire to know God and the soul." And when described by reason, "and nothing more," his ready answer is, "Nothing whatever." Ultimate reality as expressed in the infinite and finite personality and thus the goal of all his intellectual pursuits. In keeping with this, however, he says that the truth itself, the only reality in God, and his progressively unfolding plan and purpose and work. Our method of viewing knowledge's history of reality will be similar to the one previously sketched in analyzing his epistemology. We shall use (for the most part) the ready-made outline of Dean Inge's historical analysis of personalism in which he delineates the constitutive elements of the rationalist.

1. Formal, E. P. Personalism, p. 10.
2. Augustine, The Soliloquies, H. W. O. Cleveland, p. 10.
3. Formal, E. P. Op. cit., p. 107.



physics. The outline as we have adopted it is as follows:  
 (1) the nature of reality as concrete and individual; (2) the unity of the world and the world-ground; (3) reality in terms of volition; (4) the phenomenality of matter; (5) personality as the key to the ultimately real; and (6) building the thought of God.

1. The nature of reality as concrete and individual.

It is a common criticism of Augustine's thought that in his endeavor to grasp the "wholeness" of reality he frequently failed to give proper place to the unique "otherness" that is the rightful possession of the finite spirit. Augustine's piety thus at times would make his conception of the Absolute to embrace all finite existences. This desire for unity on the part of our religious genius seems to put his position out of harmony with the metaphysical pluralism of personalism. Dean Knudson summarizes the personalistic position in this regard when he observes that, <sup>1</sup>"Metaphysical existence can be predicated only of that which is individual and concrete."

However, the same author also warns us that <sup>2</sup>the pluralism for which personalism stands, is distinctly limited in character. It presupposes an underlying unity. Augustine emphasizes this unity sometimes at the loss of the individual soul's own "mutual otherness".

1. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 179.  
 2. Ibid., p. 190.



the world. The world as we have it is as follows:  
 (1) the nature of reality as concrete and indivisible; (2) the  
 unity of the world and the world-idea; (3) the unity of  
 of reality; (4) the responsibility of matter; (5) responsibility  
 on the way to the infinitely real; and (6) the unity of the thought  
 of God.

### 1. The nature of reality as concrete and indivisible.

It is a common criticism of Augustine's thought that  
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 harmony with the metaphysical position of Parmenides. Parmenides  
 himself summarizes the Parmenidean position in this regard when  
 he observes that "Inevitably, existence can be grasped only  
 of that which is indivisible and eternal."

However, the same author also warns us that the  
 position for which Parmenides stands, is distinctly limited  
 in character. It presupposes an unchanging unity. Augustine  
 emphasizes this unity sometimes at the loss of the individual  
 soul's own "eternal otherness."



And yet there are marks of independence and separateness allowed to the finite person in Augustine's writings. Concerning God he distinctly says, <sup>1</sup>"So neither art Thou the mind itself." Augustine's psychological insights were too penetrating to allow him to consent permanently to the idea that the human mind was but part of the infinite intelligence. Further, Augustine makes self-certainty the starting point in his quest for reality. In his early work, The Soliloquies, we hear Reason querying: <sup>2</sup>"You, who desire to know yourself, do you know that you are?" To this Augustine replies, "I do", but is unable to relate how he knows this. Also to the question, <sup>3</sup>"Do you know that you think?" his answer is equally a positive affirmation.

Augustine is certainly not lost in the Absolute when he writes: <sup>4</sup>"In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the Academicians, who say, What if you are deceived; and if I am deceived, by this token I am." <sup>For</sup> Augustine there is nothing more certain than his own conscious identity and individuality, and so we find him asking the rhetorical question: <sup>5</sup>"But what is nearer to me than myself?" And again: <sup>6</sup>"For whence does a mind know another mind, if it does not know itself?" Still another: <sup>7</sup>"Lastly, when the mind seeks to know itself, it already knows that it is a mind: otherwise it knows not whether

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E.B. Pusey, X, 25.
2. Augustine, A. The Soliloquies, R.E. Cleveland, p. 51.
3. loc. cit.
4. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Dods, Vol. I, City of God, XI, 3.
5. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, X, 16.
6. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III, On the Trinity, IX, 3.
7. Ibid., X, 4.



The first thing we notice of independence and respect-  
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 have a person questioning: "You, who desire to know yourself, do  
 you know that you exist?" To this Augustine replies, "No, but  
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 "Do you know that you exist?" his answer is equally a negative  
 affirmation.

Augustine is definitely not lost in the absolute when  
 he writes: "In respect of these things, I do not at all doubt  
 of the indubitability, that is, that I am existing; and if  
 I am existing, by this token I am." "Therefore there is  
 nothing more certain than his own conscious existence and truth-  
 fully, and as he finds his reality the metaphysical question:  
 "What is the nature of me then myself?" and again: "You  
 know that a mind knows another mind, if it does not know itself?"  
 Still further: "I think, when the mind seeks to know itself, it  
 already knows that it is a mind: otherwise it knows not whether

1. Augustine, The Confessions, N.E. Pusey, I, 25.
2. Augustine, The Soliloquies, N.E. Pusey, I, 21.
3. Ibid., I, 21.
4. Augustine, The Works of Augustine, N.E. Pusey, Vol. I, 21.
5. Ibid., I, 21.
6. Augustine, The Confessions, N.E. Pusey, I, 21.
7. Ibid., I, 21.
8. Ibid., I, 21.
9. Ibid., I, 21.
10. Ibid., I, 21.



it seeks itself, and perhaps seeks one thing while intending to seek another." In this connection Siebeck observes:

<sup>1</sup>"Augustine always speaks as if only of himself, the individual, to whom his personal feelings and sensations are the main thing."

Dean Knudson also points out that <sup>2</sup>"Augustine puts self-certainty above the certainty of the object." It seems clear enough to us also that Augustine is surer of his knowledge of the finite self than he is of the world of nature about him. Instance: <sup>3</sup>"For we both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it. Moreover, in these three things no true-seeming illusion disturbs us; for we do not come into contact with these things by some bodily sense, as we perceive the things outside of us, - colours, e. g., by seeing, sounds by hearing, smells by smelling, tasted by tasting, - of all which sensible objects it is the images resembling them, but not themselves which we perceive in the mind and hold in the memory, and which excites us to desire objects. But, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I know and delight in this." Such a declaration as this does not give us the impression that Augustine felt himself to be an infinitesimal part of the All Which Is. The soul is not lost in the world of things - it is superior to them. In the

1. Quoted by Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 107-8.

2. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 119.

3. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Dods, Vol. I, City of God, XI, 26.



it needs itself, and perhaps needs one thing while longing  
to seek another. In this connection I should observe:  
"Augustine always speaks of it only of himself, the truth-  
teller, to whom the personal feelings and sensations are the  
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lost in the world of things - it is superior to them. In the



language of Siebeck, <sup>1</sup>"Augustine, THE FIRST MODERN MAN, only took it (the life of the soul) into consideration, in so far as reflection upon it enabled him to conceive the inner character of personal life as something really independent of the outer world."

## 2. The unity of the world and world ground.

The idea of the Absolute is not a starting point for the philosophy of personalism, it is rather as Bowne described it, a "limit notion". Personalism affirms that <sup>2</sup>"a basal monism is necessary to meet the demands of reason." Bowne warns us, however, that <sup>3</sup>"we are not to think of this Supreme Intelligence as a rigid monotony of being, but rather as the perfect fullness of life, without temporal ebb or flow." <sup>4</sup>There is, consequently, nothing in the idea of personality which excludes that of absoluteness. Rather are we warranted in saying with Lotze that personality in its completion is possible <sup>only</sup> to the Absolute."

Augustine's description of the Absolute is not the unrelated One but the self-sustaining One. Read him, <sup>5</sup>"What are Thou then, my God? .... Most highest, most good, most potent, most omnipotent, most merciful, yet most just; most hidden, yet most present; most beautiful, yet most strong; stable, yet incomprehensible; unchangeable, yet all changing; never new,

1. Quoted by Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 108.

2. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 2020.

3. Bowne, B. P. Personalism, p. 149.

4. Knudson, A. D. op. cit., p. 52.

5. Augustine, A. The Confessions. E.B. Pusey, I, 4.



language of St. Augustine, "I am not a man, only  
 look at (the life of the soul) into contemplation, in so far  
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The idea of the Absolute is not a starting point for  
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1. Quoted by H. Reiser, *A. History of Ideas*, Vol. V, p. 108.  
 2. H. Reiser, *A. The Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 108.  
 3. H. Reiser, *A. The Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 108.  
 4. H. Reiser, *A. The Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 108.  
 5. Augustine, *A. The Confessions*, B. E. T. T. I, 4.



never old; all-renewing, and 'bringing age upon the proud, and they know it not'; ever working, ever at rest; still gathering, yet nothing lacking; support<sup>ing</sup> filling, and overspreading; creating, nourishing and maturing; seeking, yet having all things."

It is true that Augustine's idea of God at times seems to be that of <sup>a</sup>static personality, but on the whole his descriptions of the Supreme Being are best understood as that of a self-sufficient personality who alone is the complete expression of the fulness of the reality. He writes, <sup>1</sup>"For that is chiefly said to Be, which always exists in one and the same way, which is every way like itself; which can in no way be injured or changed; which is not subject to time; which cannot at one time be other than another. For this is what is most truly said to Be." With the same thought he writes, <sup>2</sup>"And I beheld the other things below Thee, and I perceived, that they neither altogether are, nor altogether are not, for they are, since they are from Thee, but are not, because they are not what Thou art. For that truly is, which remains unchangeably."

But Augustine is fundamentally in agreement with personalism in recognizing the essential unity of the world-ground. <sup>3</sup>"And therefore, whether we consider the whole body of the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement, and also all the bodies which are in it; or whether we consider all life, either that which nourishes and maintains, as the life of

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E. B. Pusey. de mor. Manich. c. 1, quoted in footnote, p. 134.

2. Augustine, A. op. cit., VII, 11.

3. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. II, The City of God, VIII, c. 6.



never old; all-renewing, and bringing age upon the young, and they know it not; ever working, ever at rest; still gathering, yet nothing lacking; support, filling, and overmastering; presence, nourishing and restoring; seeking, yet having all things.

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1. Augustine, *The Confessions*, I. 1. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.
2. Augustine, *The City of God*, I. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.
3. Schaff, *Augustine and Post-Augustine Fathers*, Vol. II, The City of God, VIII, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.



the trees; or that which, besides this, has also sensation, as the life of the beasts; or that which adds to all these intelligence, as the life of man; or that which does not need the support of nutriment, but only maintains, feels, understands, as the life of angels, - all can only BE through Him who absolutely IS .... But to Him to live, to understand, to be blessed, are to BE." The unity of the universe then is found for Augustine in the active personality of God.

### 3. Reality in terms of volition.

For <sup>1</sup>personalism, being must ultimately be active and causal if it is to be something more than a concept. The soul is a mental agent rather than a mere substance. <sup>2</sup>It (personalism) holds that reality consists in the power of action." In fact, <sup>3</sup>"reality is cause" and this <sup>4</sup>causality must be interpreted in terms of volition."

Harnack testifies concerning Augustine, <sup>5</sup>"The kernel of our nature exists indisputably according to Augustine in our will: therefore, in order that the VERITAS, the SCIRE DEUM ET ANIMAM may be able to obtain supremacy, and become, as it were, the unique function of man, the will must be won on its behalf .... ACCORDINGLY THE FREEING OF THE WILL IS ULTIMATELY THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE INTELLECT FOR THAT OF THE WILL." In his struggle for spiritual emancipation

1. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 203.

2. loc. cit.

3. Ibid., p. 205.

4. Ibid., p. 178.

5. Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. V, footnote, p. 123.



the theory; on that which, however, it is also necessary, as  
the life of the people; or that which adds to all these things  
the life of the man; or that which does not need the  
support of nature, but only maintains, feeds, and sustains  
as the life of angels. - all are only in through the  
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3. Reality in terms of volition.

For I understand, being, must ultimately be active  
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In fact, "reality is action" and this "reality" must be later-  
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Harvey testifies some of the following: "The formal  
of our nature exists independently according to the nature in  
our will; therefore, in order that the WILLING, the BEING, and  
IT ALONE may be able to obtain supremacy, and become, as it  
were, the unique function of man, the will must be won on the  
basis... ACCORDING TO THE PRESENCE OF THE WILL IN THE  
THE NO SUBSTITUTION OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE WILLING FOR THE  
OF THE WILL. In this sense, for spiritual supremacy

1. Harvey, A. C. The Philosophy of Voluntarism, p. 208.  
2. Ibid., p. 209.  
3. Ibid., p. 210.  
4. Ibid., p. 211.  
5. Ibid., p. 212.  
6. Harvey, A. C. The Philosophy of Voluntarism, p. 213.



Augustine points out clearly that his bondage lay in the will. <sup>1</sup>"Which thing I was sighing for," he writes, "bound as I was, not with another's irons, but by my own iron will." And again, <sup>2</sup>"But this raised me a little into Thy light, that I knew as well that I had a will, as that I lived: when then I did will or nill anything, I was most sure, that no other than myself did will and nill: and I all but saw that there was the cause of my sin."

Augustine again writes in discussing the question of foreknowledge, <sup>3</sup>"For what does it help him (Cicero) to say that nothing takes place without a cause, but that every cause is not fatal, there being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause? It is sufficient that he confesses that whatever happens must be preceded by a cause. For we say that those causes which are called fortuitous are not the mere name for the absence of causes, but are only latent, and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that of spirit of some kind or other. And as to natural causes, we by no means separate them from the will of Him who is the author and framer of all nature. But now as to voluntary causes. They are referable either to God, or to angels, or to men, or to animals of whatever description, if indeed those instinctive movements of animals devoid of reason, by which, in accordance with their own nature, they seek or shun various

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions E.B.Pusey, VIIIIm 5.

2. Augustine, A. Op. cit., VII, 3.

3. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Doës, The City of God, Vol. I, V, 9.



Augustine points out clearly that his knowledge lay in the will. "I was right," he writes, "because I was, not with Augustine's license, but by my own free will." And again, "But this raised me a little into the light, that I know as well that I had a will, as that I lived: when then I did will or will anything, I was most sure, that no other than myself did will and will: and I all but saw that there was the cause of my sin."

Augustine again returns to discussing the question of free-will, "For what does it help him (Quintus) to say that nothing takes place without a cause, but that every cause is not fatal, there being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause? It is sufficient that he confesses that whatever happens must be preceded by a cause. For we say that those causes which are called fortuitous are not the more new, for the absence of causes, but are only latent, and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that of spirit of some kind or other. And as to natural causes, we by no means separate them from the will of Him who is the author and creator of all nature. But now as to voluntary causes. They are referable either to God, or to angels, or to men, or to animals of whatever description, it indeed those instinctive movements of animals devoid of reason, by which in accordance with their own nature, they seek on whom various



things, are to be called wills.... And from these we conclude that there are no efficient causes of all things which come to pass unless voluntary causes, that is, such as belong to that nature which is the spirit of life.... The spirit of life, therefore, which quickens all things, and is the creator of every body, and of every created spirit, is God himself, the uncreated spirit." In another instance Augustine affirms the Eternity of the Creator and declares that, <sup>1</sup>"His substance is in no ways changed by time, nor His will separate from His substance."

In the foregoing Augustine seems to reduce all causation to will and the final source of all causative power to the divine spirit or will. This is in agreement with Bowne's position as he states: <sup>2</sup>"From our point of view, the reason for the uniformity of things, or the progress of things, must be found in the will and plan of God." Augustine further affirms the spiritual nature of causation: <sup>3</sup>"Material causes, <sup>e</sup>therefore, which may rather be said to be made than to make, are not to be reckoned among efficient causes, because they can only do what the wills of spirits do by them. How, then, does an order of causes which is certain to the foreknowledge of God necessitate that there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills, when our wills themselves have a very important place in the order of causes?"

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, XI, 15.

2. Bowne, B. P. Personalism, p. 211.

3. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Dods, Vol. I, The City of God, V, 9.







Augustine affirms the immediate awareness of active volitional powers in the human personality. He writes, <sup>1</sup>"Our wills, therefore, EXIST as WILLS, and do themselves whatever we do by willing, and which would not be done if we were unwilling."

He also posits human freedom as being in perfect harmony with the thought of the divine will. Writing to Cicero he says, <sup>2</sup>"He therefore, like a truly great and wise man, and one who consulted very much and very skilfully for the good of humanity, of those two chose the freedom of the will, to confirm which he denied the foreknowledge of future things; and thus, wishing to make men free, he makes them sacrilegious. But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety." Freedom to the finite personality for Augustine is not contradictory to the wider scope of knowledge granted the infinite mind. In the same connection he writes of <sup>3</sup>"the free exercise of our wills" and declares that God is not ignorant of our wills.

It is fair to note here, however, that while freedom in the sense of free choice is never openly destroyed by Augustine - yet the theological limitations that he <sup>sometimes</sup> imposes upon free will are such as would logically lead to determinism. For Augustine, nothing but a "good" will is truly free. In this connection Harnack criticises: <sup>4</sup>"Augustine contradicted himself in maintaining that all ability to attain goodness had been lost, and in yet admitting that freedom of choice - the decisive thing - remained."

1. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Dods, Vol. I, The City of God, V, 10.

2. Ibid., V, 9.

3. Loc. cit.

4. Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 217.







the universe but will. He declares, <sup>1</sup>"I will, therefore I am." And again, <sup>2</sup>"For the will commandeth that there be a will; not another, but itself." Harnack observes in this connection: <sup>3</sup>"Augustine himself so presented the case that no inner state and no activity of thought existed apart from the will." Again, in writing of his own struggle for a true spiritual freedom

1. Cell, G. C. Seminar on Augustine, class room notes.
2. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E. B. Pusey, VIII, 9.
3. Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. V, footnote, p. 123.



For Augustine, there are no realities in

the universe but will. He declares, "I will, therefore I

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1. Confessions, Book X, Chapter 10, lines 1-10.
2. Confessions, Book X, Chapter 10, lines 1-10.
3. Confessions, Book X, Chapter 10, lines 1-10.



Augustine observes, <sup>1</sup>"Myself when I was deliberating upon serving the Lord my God now, as I had long purposed, it was I who willed, I who nilled, I, I myself."

Augustine also identifies the divine energy with the divine will and this will is God Himself. <sup>2</sup>"Nor art Thou against Thy will constrained to any thing, since Thy will is not greater than Thy power. But greater should it be, were Thyself greater than Thyself. For the will and power of God, is God Himself."

Eucken concludes: <sup>3</sup>"Just as, in his view, the life of the soul is fundamentally and chiefly the striving for well-being and self-realisation, so its completest expression is the will, as that in which life attains unity and is raised to full activity. In fact, it is even affirmed that all beings are nothing but will (nihil aliud quam voluntates), 'the will is the comprehensive principle of all activities of mind' (Heizelmann). This conviction became steadily more pronounced throughout Augustine's life, and separated him further and further from the intellectualism of antiquity."

#### 4. The phenomenality of matter.

Bowne declares emphatically that <sup>4</sup>"Hume did philosophy a good service in showing that Nature presents nothing but succession;" and this is rigidly true. As the leading exponent of the personalistic position Bowne points out that <sup>5</sup>"there are two

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, VIII, 9.
2. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Dods, Vol. I, The City of God, V, 9.
3. Eucken, R. The Problem of Human Life, p. 267.
4. Bowne, B. P. Herbert Spencer's Laws of the Knowable, The New Englander, CXXII (Jan. 1873), p. 21.
5. Bowne, B. P. Personalism, p. 112.



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Baker comments: "Just as, in his view, the life of  
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1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, B.B. Tracy, VIII, 2.  
2. Augustine, A. The Works of Augustine, W. Bohn,  
Vol. I, The City of God, V, 2.  
3. Baker, R. The Problem of Human Life, p. 287.  
4. Bowen, R. P. Herbert Spencer's Laws of the Unknowable, The  
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5. Bowen, R. P. Personalism, p. 112.



kinds of reality, phenomenal and ontological." Then he warns,  
 1"Only the latter is substantial; the former is real for and in  
 experience; but reflective thought shows that it is properly  
 phenomenal, existing only in and for intelligence."

Augustine approaches this thought when he writes con-  
 cerning God, 2"But if ~~He~~ knew all that He made, He made only  
 those things which He had known. Whence flows a very striking  
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 ideality of nature and that matter is real only in and for  
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In our later development of Augustine's thought of  
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As a corollary of the phenomenality of matter, per-  
 sonalism declares that space, too, is phenomenal. 3"Without  
 spacial objects there would be no space. Its phenomenality,  
 therefore, is a corollary of the phenomenality of matter."  
 Likewise the ideality of time is affirmed by personalism. 4"To  
 be ontologically real, time must be active. but to so regard it  
 is to contradict the time idea."

Augustine has the conception of the ideality of time.  
 In dealing with Augustine's studies regarding the occupation

1. Bowne, B. P. Personalism, p. 112.
2. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Dods,  
 Vol. I, The City of God, XI, 10.
3. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 235.
4. loc. cit.



kind of reality, phenomenal and ontological. Then he writes, "Only the latter is substantial; the former is real for and in experience; but reflective thought shows that it is properly phenomenal, existing only in and for intelligence."

Augustine approaches this thought when he writes concerning God, "But it is known that He made. He made only those things which He had known. Whence flows a very striking but true conclusion, that this world could not be known to us unless it existed, but could not have existed unless it had been known to God." This seems to us to be an affirmation of the ideality of nature and that matter is real only in and for intelligence.

In our later development of Augustine's thought of God we shall deal more particularly with his emancipation from materialism.

As a corollary of the phenomenality of matter, personalism declares that space, too, is phenomenal. Without spatial objects there would be no space. Its phenomenality, therefore, is a corollary of the phenomenality of matter. Likewise the ideality of time is affirmed by personalism. To be ontologically real, time must be active, but to so regard it is to contradict the time idea.

Augustine has the conception of the ideality of time. In dealing with Augustine's studies regarding the conception

1. Bouvier, T. Personalism, p. 112.  
 2. Augustine, The Works of Augustine, W. Dods.  
 Vol. I, The City of God, XI, 10.  
 3. Knudsen, A. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 235.  
 4. loc. cit.



of God prior to creation, Pringle-Pattison observes, <sup>1</sup>"St. Augustine, who twice addresses himself to meet the criticism, wins a technical victory by the argument that time itself was created along with the world of moving things by which its duration is measured, so that there could be no lapse of unoccupied time before the creation, there being in eternity neither before nor after.... Cum tempore, non in tempore is Augustine's distinction; the world was not created in time but together with time." Commenting on this quotation from Augustine, Dean Knudson writes: <sup>2</sup>"The temporal is thus coexistent with the cosmic process, but unreal apart from it."

Augustine suggests the infinite divisibility of time.

<sup>3</sup>He starts with a hundred years, reduces it to the current year, then the present month, day, hour, and finally he observes:

<sup>4</sup>"Yea, that one hour passeth away in flying particles. Whatsoever of it hath flown away, is past; whatsoever remaineth is to come. If an instant of time be conceived, which cannot be divided into the smallest particles of moments, that alone is it, which may be called present. Which yet flies with such speed from future to past, as not to be lengthened out with the least stay. For if it be, it is divided into past and future. The present hath no space. Where then is the time which we call long? Is it to come?"

Augustine elsewhere queries, <sup>5</sup>"Whence it seemed to me,

1. Pringle-Pattison, A.S. The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy, p. 303.

2. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 237.

3. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, XI, 15.

4. loc. cit.

5. Ibid., XI, 26.



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Augustine elsewhere writes, "Whence it seemed to me,

1. Augustine-William, The Idea of God in the Light of  
Recent Philosophy, p. 202.  
2. Augustine, The Philosophy of Perfectionism, p. 227.  
3. Augustine, The Confessions, p. 11.  
4. loc. cit.  
5. loc. cit.



that time is nothing else than protraction; but what, I know not; and I marvel, if it be not of the mind itself?" Here is a hint that possibly time is a distension of the mind itself. And in his continued scrutiny we read, <sup>1</sup>"What then is it I measure? where is the short syllable by which I measure? where the long which I measure? Both have sounded, have flown, passed away, are no more; and yet I measure, and confidently answer (so far as is presumed on a practised sense) that as to space and time this syllable is single, that double.... It is not then themselves, which now are not, that I measure, but something in my memory, which there remains fixed. It is in thee, my mind, that I measure times.... In thee I measure times; the impression, which things as they pass by cause in thee, remains even when they are gone; this it is which is still present. I measure not the things which pass by to make this impression... Either then this is time, or I do not measure time." In this psychological study Augustine observes that his space and time measurements are the work of the mind and are not dependent upon the objective presence of the things being measured. Thus he <sup>seems to</sup> suggest that the "Two great phantoms of space and time" (for they must stand or fall together) were largely conceptual.

##### 5. Personality as the key to the ultimately real.

In the language of Dean Knudson, <sup>2</sup>"The metaphysics of

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, XI, 27.
2. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 237.



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In the language of Dean Inge, "the metaphysics of

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, B. P. Tracy, XI, 27.  
 2. Inge, A. P. The Philosophy of Personality, p. 237.



personalism may be summed up in the statement that personality is <sup>the</sup> key to reality." And again, <sup>1</sup>"From every point of view it is thus evident that in personality we have the crown of the personalistic system, the keystone in its arch, the master light of all our metaphysical seeing."

On the same subject Bowne writes, <sup>2</sup>"Personality can never be construed as a product or a compound; it can only be experienced as a fact.... Whenever we attempt to go behind this fact we are trying to explain the explanation.... When we have lived and described the personal life we have done all that is possible in sane and sober speculation. If we try to do more we only fall a prey to abstractions. This self-conscious existence is the truly ultimate fact."

Augustine reveals a decided personalistic emphasis in his constant and dominant interest in the finite and infinite personalities. <sup>3</sup>"God and the soul" - the soul and its God; this is his constant theme.

Augustine's interest in the personal values is indicated by the way in which he frequently contrasts the import of man's personal being with the ramifications of nature, - always decidedly with the view of minimizing the starry heavens and elevating the personal worth. <sup>4</sup>"The knowledge of things terrestrial and celestial is commonly thought much of by men, Yet those doubtless judge better who prefer to that knowledge, the knowledge of themselves; and that mind is more praiseworthy which

1. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 238,

2. Bowne, B. P. Personalism, p. 265.

3. Augustine, A. The Soliloquies, R.E. Cleveland, p. 10.

4. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III, On the Trinity, IV, 1.



personality is summed up in the statement that personality is "key to reality." And again, "From every point of view it is thus evident that in personality we have the crown of the personistic system. The hypothesis in its own right, the master light of all our metaphysical seeing."

On the same subject he writes, "Personality can never be considered as a product of a compound; it can only be experienced as a fact.... Whenever we attempt to go behind this fact we are trying to explain the explanation.... When we have lived and described the personal life we have done all that is possible in our own sphere of speculation. If we try to do more we only fall prey to abstraction. This self-conscious existence is the truly ultimate fact."

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1. Augustine, A. The Philosophy of Personality, p. 288.  
2. Augustine, A. The Philosophy of Personality, p. 288.  
3. Augustine, A. The Philosophy of Personality, p. 10.  
4. Augustine, A. The Philosophy of Personality, Vol. III, On the Trinity, IV, 1.



knows even its own weakness, than that which, without regard to this, searches out, and even comes to know, the ways of the stars, or which holds fast such knowledge already acquired, while ignorant of the way by which itself to enter into its own proper health and strength." Again, <sup>1</sup>"For Thy spiritual works are before these corporeal works, celestial though they be, and shining."

Eucken observes this controlling interest in Augustine's thought and writes: <sup>2</sup>"The development of Augustine's thought is in a pre-eminent degree an expression of personality, in fact, of direct personal life. All his work, indeed, serves the one purpose of the unfolding and enjoyment of his own being; in all the varied form of activity the ultimate goal remains the same, the well-being of the entire nature. Happiness, blessedness, this it is upon which the whole thought and passionate longing of the man are concentrated - happiness, not in the restricted sense of the earlier Latin Fathers, but as the complete satisfaction of the inner nature, as the vivifying of all the powers, as blessedness extending to the deepest foundations of being." This suggested relationship of happiness to being is reflected in the following passage from Augustine: <sup>3</sup>"Further, as there is no one who does not wish to be happy, so there is no one who does not wish to be. For how can he be happy, if he is nothing."

Harnack also points out that <sup>4</sup>"He (Augustine) found what had been long sought for: the making of the inner life the

1. Augustine A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, III, 6.
2. Eucken, R. The Problem of Human Life, p. 211.
3. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Dods, Vol. I, The City of God, XI, 26.
4. Harnack, A. The History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 107.



knows even its own weakness, than that which, without regard to this, searches out, and even comes to know, the ways of the stars, or which holds fast such knowledge already acquired, while ignorant of the way by which itself to enter into its own proper path and strength." Again, "For thy spiritual works are before these corporeal works, celestial though they be, and shining."

Thomson observes this controlling interest in Augustine's thought and writes: "The development of Augustine's thought in its pre-eminent degree an expression of personality, in fact, of direct personal life. All his work, indeed, serves the one purpose of the unfolding and enjoyment of his own being; in all the varied form of activity the ultimate goal remains the same, the well-being of the entire nature. Happiness, blessedness, this it is upon which the whole thought and passionate longing of the man are concentrated - happiness, not in the restricted sense of the earlier Latin Fathers, but as the complete satisfaction of the inner nature, as the vivifying of all the powers, as blessedness extending to the deepest foundations of being." This suggested relationship of happiness to being is reflected in the following passage from Augustine: "Further, as there is no one who does not wish to be happy, so there is no one who does not wish to be. For how can he be happy, if he is nothing."

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1. Augustine, *The Confessions*, B.E. Warney, III, 6.
2. *The Works of Augustine*, P. Siff.
3. *The Works of Augustine*, M. Dods.
- Vol. I, *The City of God*, XI, 36.
4. Harnack, *A. The History of Dogma*, Vol. V, p. 109.



starting point of reflection on the world," thus, <sup>1</sup>"The command 'Know thyself' (Γινώθι σεαυτόν) became for him the way to God." Reality is thus to be investigated and discovered through personality, according to Augustine. <sup>2</sup>"God", writes Augustine, "Beneath whom, in whom, with whom, is everything: who hast made man after Thine own image and likeness, which he who knows himself discovers." Here we find the suggestion that man's own personality should properly be the first principle of metaphysics.

Augustine recognizes something of the profound depth and inexhaustible nature of personality. It is the key to the real but is itself, unanalyzable. We read: <sup>3</sup>"Man himself is a great deep, whose very 'hairs Thou numberest', O Lord, 'and they fall not to the ground without Thee'. And yet are the hairs of his head easier to be numbered than his feelings, and the beatings of his heart." And again: <sup>4</sup>"Great is the power of memory, a fearful thing, O my God, a deep and boundless manifoldness; and this thing is the mind, and this am I myself. What am I then, O my God? What nature am I? A life various and manifold, and exceeding immense."

<sup>5</sup>"Augustine really makes memory the totality of experience," this is the observation of Dr. Cell. And it is in the wide range of his own conscious personal experience that Augustine learns something of the vastness within the limits

1. Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 107.
2. Augustine, A. The Soliloquies, R.E.Cleveland, p. 7.
3. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B.Pusey, IV, 14.
4. Ibid., X, 17.
5. Cell, G.C. Lectures in Seminar on Augustine.



starting point of reflection on the world, "I am," the command  
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1. Aristotle, *A History of Rome*, Vol. V, p. 107.
2. Aristotle, *The Politics*, B. 1, 1292a, 10.
3. Aristotle, *The Politics*, B. 1, 1292a, 10.
4. Ibid., X, 17.
5. Gell, G. D., *Lectures in Science on Aristotle*.



of his own personality. <sup>1</sup>"Great is this force of memory, excessive, great, O my God; a large and boundless chamber! who ever sounded the bottom thereof? yet is this a power of mine, and belongs unto my nature; nor do I comprehend all that I am. Therefore is the mind too strait to contain itself. And where should that be, which it containeth not of itself? Is it without it, and not within? how then doth it not comprehend (contain) itself? A wonderful admiration surprises me, amazement seizes me upon this." Thus the totality of personal being for Augustine, is larger than the intellect. Again we read: <sup>2</sup>"He made also man after his own image and likeness, in the mind: for ~~in~~ that is the image of God. This is the reason why the mind cannot be comprehended even by itself, because in it is the image of God."

In somewhat the same vein we read from Bowne's pen: <sup>3</sup>"Man himself in his essential personality is as unpicturable and formless as God." And again: <sup>4</sup>"Intellect explains everything but itself. It exhibits other things as its own products and as exemplifying its own principles; but it never explains itself."

But despite the inscrutability of the mind, there is an immediate self-certainty which makes for unity in the active, personal life, according to Augustine. Instance: <sup>5</sup>"In brief, by all these three things, it is I that remember, I that understand,

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, X, 8.
2. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III, On the Creed, c. 2.
3. Bowne, B. P. Personalism, p. 266.
4. Ibid., p. 215.
5. Schaff, P. op. cit. Vol. III, On the Trinity, XV, 22.



of his own personality. Indeed in this sense of reality, as-  
sertive, great, O my God; a large and formative character; and  
ever rounded the better than that of this a power of mind,  
and believe into its nature; now do I comprehend all that I see.  
Therefore in the mind, on itself to contain itself, and when  
thought that be, which is contained not of itself, in it with  
it, and not without? Now then both it and its own (containing)  
itself, I wonder if I have not been so, and so on, and so on,  
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is larger than the intellect. Again we read: "The mind is also  
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and as exemplifying its own principles; but it never explains  
itself."

But despite the inexpressibility of the mind, transcending  
an intellective self-consciousness which makes for unity in the active,  
personal life, according to Augustine, I think, in fact, in  
all these three things, it is I that remember, I that understand,

1. Augustine, *The Confessions*, trans. J. E. Glanville, 1912.  
2. Schell, *St. Thomas and the Christian Philosophy*, Vol. III, 1910.  
3. Breda, *St. Thomas*, 1910.  
4. Breda, *St. Thomas*, 1910.  
5. Breda, *St. Thomas*, 1910.  
6. Breda, *St. Thomas*, 1910.  
7. Breda, *St. Thomas*, 1910.



I that love, whom am neither memory, nor understanding, nor love, but who have them." Augustine also queries: <sup>1</sup>"Further, what in it is so known to itself, as that it lives? And it cannot at once be a mind, and not love, while it has also something over and above, viz., that it understands: for the souls of the beasts also live, but do not understand. As therefore a mind is a whole mind, so it lives as a whole. But it knows that it lives." And continuing: <sup>2</sup>"Lastly, when the mind seeks to know itself, it already knows that it is a mind: otherwise it knows not whether it seeks itself, and perhaps seeks one thing while intending to seek another." Here we find the answer to the questions of abstract thought regarding identity, change, one and many, in man's conscious personal life.

The key to the ultimately real is thus to be found first and last in man's own personal being. It is the starting point of sober reflection and the final word in all conclusions regarding metaphysics. In a memorable passage in The Confessions Augustine suggests the common error of mankind in ignoring the key within their grasp that opens the doors to abiding reality. <sup>3</sup>"And men go abroad to admire the heights of mountains, the mighty billows of the sea, the long courses of the rivers, the compass of the ocean, and the circuits of the stars, and pass themselves by." He also points out that this was his own error when engulfed in materialistic modes of thought

1. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III, On the Trinity. X, c. 4.

2. loc. cit.

3. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, X, 8.



I find love, when we neither know, nor understand, nor love, but who have them. Augustine also writes: "Further, what in it is so known to itself, as that it lives? And it cannot at once be a mind, and not love, while it is also something over and above, viz., that it understands for the sake of the beasts also live, but do not understand, as there-fore a mind is a whole mind, as it lives as a whole. But it knows that it lives," and concluding: "Lastly, when the mind seems to know itself, it already knows that it is a mind: other-wise it knows not whether it seeks itself, and perhaps seeks one thing while intending to seek another." Here we find the answer to the questions of abstract thought regarding identity, change, and many, in man's conscious personal life.

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J. Robert, L. E. Jones and Lost-Wilderness Fathers, Vol. III, On the Trinity, X, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.



and<sup>in</sup> the life unethical. <sup>1</sup>"And behold, Thou wert within, and I abroad, and there I searched for Thee; deformed I, plunging amid those fair forms, which Thou hadst made." Similarly, <sup>2</sup>"Thou hadst made me wiser, yet did I walk in darkness, and in slippery places, and sought Thee abroad out of myself, and found not the God of my heart."

Commenting on this emphasis found in Augustine, Siebeck concludes: <sup>3</sup>"The external owes all its importance and value in his eyes to the form it assumes as reflected in the internal. Everything is dominated not by problems of nature and the State and the secular ethics, but by those of the deepest wants of mind and heart, of love and faith, hope and conscience. The proper objects and the moving forces of his speculation are not found in the relation of inward to outward, but of inner to innermost, to the sense of vision of God in the heart." Thus, <sup>4</sup>"the inner subject of its (intellect's) reflections was to consist, henceforth, not in the external world, nor in the internal discussed by means of analogy with, and method of, the external, but in the kernel of personality, conscience in connection with emotion and will."

Augustine sees the footprints of God in the world of nature about him, but the real key to an understanding of the Supreme Being is to be found within the transgressor's own inner life. <sup>5</sup>"He made these (souls), nor is He far off. For He did not

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, X, 27.

2. Ibid., VI, 1.

3. Quoted by Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 107.

4. Ibid., p. 108.

5. Augustine, A. op. cit., IV, 12.



and the life unbroken. I am beheld, those were within, and I  
spread, and there I searched for those; beheld I, finding within  
those fair forms, which those hearts were. "Similarly,"  
heart made no error, yet did I walk in darkness, and in slightly  
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1. Augustine, *The Confessions*, B. E. Street, I, 27.
2. Ibid., I, 1.
3. Quoted by Lynch, *A History of Rome*, Vol. V, p. 104.
4. Ibid., p. 106.
5. Augustine, *De op. cit.*, IV, 12.



make them, and so depart, but they are of Him, and in Him. See there He is,,where truth is loved. He is within the very heart, yet hath the heart strayed from Him. 'Go back into your heart, ye treansgressors', and cleave fast to Him that hath made you."

In The City of God he repeats this thought in even clearer fashion. <sup>1</sup>"But we are men, created in the image of our Creator, whose eternity is true, and whose truth is eternal, whose love is eternal and true....; and, therefore, while, as we run over all the works which He has established, we may detect as it were, His footprints, now more and now less distinct even in those things that are beneath us, since they could not so much as exist, or be bodied forth in any shape, or follow and observe any law, had they not been made by Him who supremely is, and is supremely good and supremely wise; yet in ourselves beholding His image, let us, like the younger son of the gospel, come to ourselves, and arise and return to Him from whom by our sin we had departed."

Personality reaches its pinnacle in Augustine's estimation when he describes it in several instances as <sup>2&3</sup>"that alone which He (God) Himself alone is higher, (or better)." And the ladder by which the finite spirit approaches the Infinite One is described as being within man himself. <sup>4</sup>"Where then are the ladders? For we behold so great an interval be-

1. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Dods, Vol. I, The City of God, XI, 28.

2. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III, On the Trinity, XI, 5.

3. Augustine, A. op. cit., XI, 2.

4. Schaff, P. op. cit., Vol. VIII, On the Psalms, Ps. 123, 2.



take them, and so depart, but they are of Him, and in Him.  
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1. Augustine, The Works of Augustine, Vol. I, The City of God, XI, 287.
2. John 1:1-14, John 1:1-14, Vol. I, 111.
3. Augustine, On the Trinity, XI, 8.
4. John 1:1-14, Vol. I, 111.



tween heaven and earth, there is so wide a separation, and so great a space of regions between: we wish to climb thither, we see no ladder; do we deceive ourselves, because we sing the Song of Degrees, that is, the song of ascent? We ascend unto heaven, if we think of God, who hath made ascending steps in the heart. What is to ascend in heart? To advance towards God." And again,  
<sup>1</sup>"By my very soul Will I ascend to Him" Thus Augustine knew reality in so far as it was like himself. He was indeed his own microcosm. And in the language of Dean Knudson, <sup>2</sup>"Not only is the ego necessarily involved in all knowledge of reality, but it is in the ego that all fundamental principles of thought have their seat and find their meaning.... Only as reality is lifted to the personal plane does it become amenable to the demands of reason."

#### 6. Building the thought of God.

Augustine's thought of God is so vital to his entire philosophic structure that it seems fitting at this point to trace somewhat the development of his religious thought.

In his youth we find (according to The Confessions) that Augustine became engulfed in the error of Manichaeism; for it afforded him a comfortable atmosphere for his early rationalistic tendencies. It was also freely critical of the Scriptures and afforded some kind of explanation for the problem of evil in its ethical dualism. This fantastic mode of thought occupied the attention of the young intellectual for nine years until he finally

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, X, 7.
2. Knudson, A.D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 246.



...the world of earth, there is no such a thing as a ...  
...of reason between us with ...  
...and no ... to be ...  
...of ... the ...  
...of ... the ...  
...to be ...  
...very ...  
...is ...  
...the ...  
...is ...  
...and ...  
...of ...

2. Following the thought of ...

...thought of ... is ...  
...that it ...  
...the development of his religious thought.  
In his youth he ...  
...in the error of ...  
...it ...  
...It was also ...  
...and ...  
...the ...  
...of the ...

1. ...  
2. ...



became convinced that Manichaeism was simply a philosophy of negation .

From Manichaeism, Augustine drifted into materialistic modes of thought and for two years, followed the zig-zag path of the "doubters". However, in the course of his intellectual wanderings he stumbled upon certain Neo-Platonic writings which gave him a spiritual concept of being. Heretofore, he declares, he had been <sup>1</sup>"gross-hearted, nor clear even to myself, whatsoever was not extended over certain spaces, nor diffused, nor condensed, nor swelled out, or did not or could not receive some of these dimensions, I thought to be altogether nothing." Likewise concerning God himself, he writes, <sup>2</sup>"So also did I endeavor to conceive of Thee, Life of my life, as vast, through infinite spaces, on every side penetrating the whole mass of the universe, and beyond it, every way, through immeasurable boundless spaces; so that the Earth should have Thee, the heaven have Thee, all things have Thee, and they be bounded in Thee, and Thou bounded nowhere." But the Neo-platonic writings afforded Augustine his emancipation from this crass materialism, and at the close of a rather long drawn out struggle, he concludes that reality is spiritual rather than spatial.

Thus we read later in his experience: <sup>3</sup>"But what do I love, when I love Thee? not beauty of bodies, nor the fair harmony of time, nor the brightness of the light, so gladsome to our eyes, nor sweet melodies of varied songs, nor the fragrant

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B.Pusey, VII, 1.

2. Ibid., VII, 1.

3. Ibid., X, 6.



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1. Augustine, The Confessions, B.E. Press, VII, 1.  
2. Ibid., VII, 1.  
3. Ibid., I, 6.



smell of flowers, and ointments, and spices, not manna and honey, not limbs acceptable to embracements of flesh. None of these I love, when I love my God; and yet I love a kind of light, and melody, and fragrance, and meat, and embracement, when I love my God, the light, melody, fragrance, meat, embracement of my inner man: where there shineth unto my soul, what space cannot contain, and there soundeth, what time beareth not away, and there smelleth, what breathing disperseth not, and there tasteth, what eating diminisheth not, and there clingeth, what satiety divorceth not. This is it which I love, when I love my God."

In his work On the Trinity Augustine states emphatically, <sup>1</sup>"For certainly He is neither earth or heaven; nor, as it were, earth and heaven; nor any such thing as we do not see, but which perhaps is in heaven.... For it is written that 'God is light'; not in such way as these eyes see, but in such way as the heart sees, when it is said, He is truth (reality)."

God is to be known for Augustine through "his works", but his emphasis is never upon the celestial and shining works of nature, but upon man himself who is not only from God, but of God. Thus God is like man, for man is like God. Instance: <sup>2</sup>"But 'from Him', does not mean the same as 'of Him'. *ex ipso* and *de ipso*). For what is of Him may be said to be from Him; but not everything that is from Him is rightly said to be of Him. For from Him are heaven and earth, because He made them; but not of Him

1. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III, On the Trinity, VIII, 3.

2. Ibid., Nature of Good, Against the Manichaeans, Vol. IV, c. 27.







because they are not of His substance. As in the case of a man who begets a son and makes a house, from himself is the son, from himself is the house, but the son is of him, the house is of earth and wood." No clearer illustration of the affinity between personality and reality could be asked for than this one that Augustine gives us in the suggested relation and kinship of father and son. Also, in the striking contrast he draws between nature and personality, the odds are certainly in favor of the latter and nature is left rather "wooden".

Harnack points out that,<sup>1</sup> "Augustine was so strongly possessed by the feeling, never, indeed, clearly formulated, that GOD IS A PERSON whom we must trust and love, that this conviction was even a latent standard in his Trinitarian speculations." This thought is suggested in the following passage: <sup>2</sup>"O Thou Good omnipotent, who so carest for every one of us, as if Thou caredst for him only; and so for all, as if they were but one!"

In building his thought of God from a philosophical standpoint Augustine lays great stress upon the value judgments, the idea of worth, and upon the person of Supreme Good. <sup>3</sup>This is fundamentally the personalistic emphasis.

Dean Knudson reminds us, <sup>4</sup>"In strict logic one cannot pass from what ought to be to what is, or from subjective interests to objective facts. But in actual life the transition is made, and it is made in one form or another by everyone.... In

1. Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 122.
2. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, III, 11.
3. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 314.
4. Ibid., p. 307-8.



because they are not of this substance. As in the case of a man who begets a son and makes a house, from himself in the son, from himself is the house, but the son is of him, the house is of earth and wood. No clearer illustration of the affinity between personality and reality could be asked for than this one that Augustine gives us in the suggested relation and kinship of father and son. Also, in the striking contrast he draws between nature and personality, the odds are certainly in favor of the latter and nature is left rather "wooden".

Hervaeus points out that Augustine was so strongly

possessed by his feeling, never, indeed, clearly formulated,

that GOD IS A PERSON whom we must first and love, that this con-

viction was even a latent standard in his Christian speculation.

This thought is suggested in the following passage: "God knows

God omnipotent, who so created for every one of us, as if from

carved for his only; and so for all, as if they were but one."

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1. Hervaeus, *A History of Dogma*, Vol. V, p. 122.
2. Augustine, *The City of God*, Book VIII, ch. 11.
3. Augustine, *The City of God*, Book VIII, ch. 11.
4. Ibid., p. 207-8.



spite of ourselves the ideals of life assert themselves. They become determining factors in belief.... Man will not allow the element of worth to be eliminated from their world-view."

Augustine himself in his quest for spiritual deliverance and emancipation from the arid wastes of materialism indicates that <sup>1</sup>he began his journey forward at the point where he began to prefer one thing to another. He writes: <sup>2</sup>"And I did in my inmost soul believe that Thou wert incorruptible, and uninjurable, and unchangeable; because though not knowing whence or how, yet I saw plainly and was sure, that that which may be corrupted must be inferior to that which cannot; what could not be injured I preferred unhesitatingly to what could receive injury; the unchangeable to things subject to change. My heart passionately cried out against all these phantoms, and with this one blow I sought to beat away from the eye of my mind all that unclean troop, which buzzed around it." And when the final insight came concerning the essential spiritual nature of reality, it arrived on the wings of a value judgment. Thus he relates, <sup>3</sup>"When without all doubt, it (the reasoning faculty) cried out, 'That the unchangeable was to be preferred to the changeable; whence also it knew That Unchangeable; which, unless it had in some way known, it had had no sure ground to prefer it to the changeable. And thus with the flash of one trembling glance it arrived at THAT WHICH IS. And then I saw Thy 'invisible

1. Cell, G. C. Seminar on Augustine, class room notes.

2. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, VII, 1.

3. Ibid., VII, 17.







things understood by the things which were made.<sup>1</sup>"

Augustine repeatedly speaks of God as the Highest Good. God is truth and God is power, to be sure, but Augustine's emphasis lies in the fact that God is good. This he undoubtedly learned from Plato. Augustine observes: <sup>1</sup>"Who, then, but the most miserable will deny that he is blessed, who enjoys that which he loves, and loves the true and highest good? But the true and highest good according to Plato is God." This thought is repeated by Augustine again and again. <sup>2</sup>"The perfection of all our good things and our perfect good things and our perfect good is God."

As Harnack puts it, <sup>3</sup>"The 'summum bonum' now meant that which ought to be," and <sup>4</sup>"the Supreme Being is the Supreme Good; He is a person." In his work On the Trinity, Augustine writes, <sup>5</sup>"So God is to be loved, not this and that good, but the good itself. For the good that must be sought for the soul is not one above which it is to fly by judging, but to which it is to cleave by loving; and what can this be except God? Not a good mind, or a good angel, or the good heaven, but the good good." In fact, God is considered better than the best that finite mind can desire or think concerning him. <sup>6</sup>"And nothing is more exalted above us than God." Again, <sup>7</sup>"For never soul was, nor shall be, able to conceive any think which may be better than Thou, who art the sovereign and the best good. But

1. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. II, The City of God, VIII, 8.

2. Ibid., Vol. IV, On the Morals of the Catholic Church, c. 8.

3. Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 117.

4. loc. cit.

5. Schaff, P. op. cit., Vol. III, On the Trinity, VIII, 4.

6. Ibid., Vol. II, The City of God, XIV, 13.

7. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, VII, 4.



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1. Schaff, N. Manual of Christian Literature, Vol. II, the  
City of God, VIII, 1.
2. Ibid., Vol. IV, On the Morals of the Christian Church, c. 2.
3. Bernard, A. History of Books, Vol. V, p. 117.
4. Ibid., c. 10.
5. Schaff, N. op. cit., Vol. III, On the Trinity, VIII, 1.
6. Ibid., Vol. II, The City of God, XIV, 12.
7. Augustine, A. The Confessions, B. Library, VII, 1.



since most truly and certainly, the incorruptible is preferable to the corruptible, (as I did now prefer it,) then, wert Thou not incorruptible, I could in thought have arrived at something better than my God. When then I saw the incorruptible to be preferable to the corruptible, there ought I to seek for Thee." Here Augustine declares emphatically for the validity of value judgments. As Siebeck puts it, the supreme decision no longer must rest on reason alone, but on <sup>1</sup>"the irresistible force of the internal".

Augustine also sees the value of the ideal in practical living when he declares, <sup>2</sup>"For he lives ill who does not believe well". This has some bearing to the position of personalism which holds, <sup>3</sup>"that the rejection of the belief of God would have disastrous consequences for the higher spiritual interests of men." This too was Bowne's position.

Even in his view of the Trinity with all of its complicated implications, Augustine approaches the problem from the psychological point of view rather than the social. He emphasizes unity in consciousness rather than three distinct centers of consciousness. Again his emphasis is akin to that of personalism. God is for Augustine the perfect personality and even in his Trinitarian views his concepts are based largely on the insights obtained from his own nature. The Trinity is <sup>4</sup>"reproduced in every being, but particularly in the human soul."

1. Quoted by Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 108.
2. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Dodds, Vol. I, The City of God, V, 10.
3. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 312.
4. Eucken, R. The Problem of Human Life, p. 218.







Augustine writes, <sup>1</sup>"Which of us comprehendeth the Almighty Trinity?.... I would that man would consider these three, that are in themselves.... Now the three I speak of are, to Be , to Know, and to Will.... In these three then, let him discern that can, how inseparable a life there is, yea one life, one mind, and one essence, yea lastly, how inseparable a distinction there is, and yet a distinction. Surely a man hath it before him; let him look into himself, and see, and tell me." And again, <sup>2</sup>"The mind itself, and its knowledge, and love, as the third, is a sort of image of the Trinity; and these three are one, and one substance."

Commenting on the above approach, Shedd observes, <sup>3</sup>"Augustine starts with the assumption that man was made in the image of the TRIUNE God, the God of revelation; not in the image of the God of natural religion, or the untriune deity of the nations. Consequently, it is to be expected that a trinitarian analogue can be found in his mental constitution. If man is God's image, he will show traces of it in every respect. All acknowledge that the Divine unity, and all the communicable attributes, have their finite correspondents in the unity, and attributes of the human mind. But the Latin father goes further than this. This, in his view, is not the whole of the Divine image. When God says, 'Let US make man in OUR image, after OUR likeness', (Gen.1:26), Augustine understands these words to be

1. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B.Pusey, XIII, 11.

2. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III, On the Trinity, IX, c. 4 and 5.

3. Ibid., Vol. III, On the Trinity. Introduction by W.G.T. Shedd, p. 4.



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1. Augustine, The Confessions, 10.11, 11.11.  
2. Schell, The Trinity and the Father, 101, 111, 121.  
3. Ibid., 101, 111, 121.  
4. Ibid., 101, 111, 121.



spoken BY the Trinity, and OF the Trinity - by and of the true God, the God of revelation: the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, one God."

Augustine follows out his psychological study and uses the finite memory, understanding and will (or love) as analogous with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, respectively. He writes, <sup>1</sup>"I have undoubtedly taken pains as far as I could, not indeed so that the thing might be seen face to face, but that it might be seen by this likeness in an enigma, in how small a degree soever, by conjective, in our memory and understanding, to intimate God and the Father and God and the Son.... But I have shown nothing in this enigma respecting the Holy Spirit such as might appear to be like Him, except our own will, or love, or affection, which is a stronger will." Thus, <sup>2</sup>"the most perfect image of the Trinity, says Augustine, is the thought of the inner man, not sensuous and external cognition, but that of the self-consciousness; as the three elements of which he gives prominence to, the MEMORIA or the inwardness of the spirit, its self-inclusion; the formulation of thought, by means of which the spirit proceeds out of itself, and itself becomes an object, INTELLIGENTIA (or MENS); finally, love (AMOR), which presents the closest unity of MEMORIA and INTELLIGENTIA."

In positing the fact, however, that an image of the Trinity existed in man's own nature, Augustine is careful to point out that this image is an imperfect and inadequate one.

1. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III, On the Trinity, XV, 21.

2. Dörner, J. A. A System of Christian Doctrine, Vol. I, p. 392.







He is simply looking through the glass darkly and gives vent to his own profound sense of the inscrutability and incomprehensibility of the Supreme Being in any adequate sense. Here is his typical attitude: <sup>1</sup>"I pray to our Lord God himself, of whom we ought always to think, and yet of whom we are not able to think worthily, and whom no speech is sufficient to declare, that He will grant me both help for understanding and explaining that which I design, and pardon if <sup>in</sup> anything I offend." This certainly is not the mood of an extreme rationalist trying to explore and expound the Almighty to perfection.

But despite the inscrutability of God, Augustine holds to the simplicity of God - not the simplicity of weakness but the simplicity of unity. Harnack observes, <sup>2</sup>"He took over from Plotinus the thought of the simplicity of God and attempted actually to make use of it."

Augustine avers: <sup>3</sup> "There is, accordingly, a god which is alone simple, and therefore alone unchangeable, and this is God." In the same connection he writes, <sup>4</sup> "And this Trinity is one God; and none the less simple because a Trinity." In fact, simplicity and unity are essential to reality, according to Augustine. <sup>5</sup> "Thus, so far as anything acquires unity, so far it exists. For uniformity and harmony are the effects of unity and by these compound things exist so far as they have existence. For simple things exist by themselves, for they are one."

1. Schaff, P. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III, On the Trinity, V, 1.

2. Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. IV, footnote, p. 132.

3. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Dodds, Vol. I, The City of God, XI, 10.

4. loc. cit.

5. Schaff, P. op. cit., Vol. IV, On the Morals of the Manichaeans, c. 6.







Also, in building his thought of Christ, Augustine departs from the Greek intellectualism of his day and attaches unique significance to the human element (homo) in Christ. Harnack declares that, <sup>1</sup>"Augustine started from the human nature (soul) in his construction of the God-man." He certainly gives a central place to Christ and <sup>2</sup>manifests his deepest interest in the human soul of Jesus.

In his study of Platonism Augustine failed to find the humanity of Christ and makes mention of it as something lacking, in The Confessions. <sup>3</sup>"But that 'the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us', I read not there."

The Bishop of Hippo refuses to posit anything less than a complete human nature in Christ, comparable to his own. <sup>4</sup>"For, to prevent us from seeking for one purgation for the part which Porphyry calls intellectual, and another for the part he calls spiritual, and another for the body itself, our most mighty and truthful Purifier and Savior assumed the whole human nature." Christ is indeed the perfect man. <sup>5</sup>"Since then they were written truly, I acknowledge a perfect man to be in Christ; not the body of a man only, nor, with the body, a sensitive soul without a rational, but very man, whom, not only as being, a form of Truth, but for a certain great excellency of human nature and a more perfect participation of wisdom, I judged to be preferred before others." Christ then became for him the way to reality

1. Harnack, A. History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 128.

2. loc. cit.

3. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, VII, 9.

4. Augustine, A. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, M. Dods, Vol. I, City of God, X, 32.

5. Augustine, A. The Confessions, E.B. Pusey, VII, 19.







because of his fundamental kinship and genuine humanity. His perfect personality made Him to be preferred above all others. "For this is the Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus. For it is <sup>as</sup> man that He is the Mediator and the Way." In this respect, too, Augustine is friendly to the common personalistic position.

We have not tried to harmonize the contradictions, apparent and otherwise, in Augustine. Our presentation is rather a view of his personalistic thought giving some selected passages and insights that reveal this emphasis.

We have confined our source work largely to The City of God, as our title would indicate, but have not made this limitation a strict one. We have also used other works, especially his treatise, On the Trinity. Both of these works need have written by Augustine in the epoch of his maturity and therefore may be said to be truly representative of his best thought.

As to secondary sources, the most fruitful and have been Baruch's History of Ideas and Eric Lundin's The Philosophy of Personalism.

We have approached the problem first of all by studying Augustine's epistemology, accepting it by the standards outlined in The Philosophy of Personalism. We have found Augustine to be somewhat at odds with personalism here, so much so that he seems at times to fail to distinguish between truth as a personal concept and truth as objectively real. The parallel that exists between these two



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#### IV. SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING.

In the foregoing we have endeavored to show that Augustine had within his writings nearly all of the essential earmarks of a personalistic ontology. These are not presented by him in any systematic way, and frequently his insights are made without due regard to their implications and thus are sometimes to be found in a state of arrested development.

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As to secondary sources, the most fruitful ones have been Harnack's History of Dogma and Dean Knudson's The Philosophy of Personalism.

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## IV. THEORY OF THE PERSONALIST.

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runs so close for Augustine, that at times they become identical. However, we do find in Augustine's writings enough of earnest inquiry into the theory of knowledge itself, that we are forced to admit that he faced the practical problem of finding the paths to reality.

The essential elements of personalism's epistemology are all to be found in Augustine; not with the same clarity and harmony of course, as in modern philosophy, but with the same decided emphasis.

He has the insight of the dualism of thought and thing and arrives at it through a psychological study of memory. He sees the mind as something "other" than its thought, feelings and activities. Of course this insight is undeveloped, but the germinal idea is there just the same.

The Kantian idea of the creative activity of thought is also to be found in Augustine. Again we admit that he lacks the emphasis and delineations of modern philosophy, but he is certainly far removed from the view that holds to the Mind's passivity. Augustine does not seem to observe that sensations themselves are thought-products, but he does suggest something of their inarticulate state without the active mind. At least he shows that the mind is capable of varied reproductions and creations from material other than sense material.

There is also a certain workable validity and trustworthiness to be allowed to reason, according to Augustine. Skepticism has odious bonds that are to be avoided. Faith is really a



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There is also a certain verifiable validity and trustworthiness to be allowed to reason, according to Augustine. Skepticism has obvious bonds that are to be avoided, which is really a



practical postulate for all knowledge, but is itself not capable of logical rationalization.

The outstanding thing worthy of note about Augustine's epistemology, however, is that it contains the same decided emphasis as the personalistic school, namely, upon the primacy of the practical reason. Augustine suggests the cognitive function of will for knowledge and shows a remarkable clearness in his insights regarding the validity of value judgments. These we have pointed out especially in connection with Augustine's personal emancipation from materialistic modes of thought. The powers of the intellect were looked upon by him now from a new point of view, owing to the influence exerted on them by the heart and <sup>the</sup> will.

When we come to Augustine's theory of being we find that it is personalistic first of all in that it is essentially a philosophy of metaphysics. To know God and the soul- the soul and its God; this was his gift and task. Ultimate reality as experienced by the finite and infinite personalities are both subject and predicate for Augustine, all of the time.

In our restricted study of his metaphysics we find the tell-tale marks of personalism, although not consistently without contradictions and omissions. The nature of reality he presents as concrete and individual, although frequently his conception of the Absolute makes Him to embrace all finite existences. But Augustine lays great stress upon self-certainty and avers that he is surer of his personal self than he is of the objective world





about him.

There is also a fundamental unity of the world and world-ground in the person and will of God, according to Augustine. This agrees essentially with personalism's affirmation that,<sup>1</sup> "A basal monism is necessary to meet the demands of reason." This monism is not that of an unrelated Absolute but rather of One who alone has fulness of being and is unconditioned.

Again, Augustine interprets reality in terms of volition. For personalism, <sup>2</sup>"reality is cause", and this <sup>3</sup>"causality must be interpreted in terms of volition." The kernel of our nature, according to Augustine, lies in the will. The will of God also is not separate from his reality. In fact, there are not realities in the universe but will. And it was this conviction, as <sup>4</sup>Eucken puts it, that separated Augustine further and further from the intellectualism of antiquity.

Regarding personalism's position on the phenomenality of matter, Augustine's thought is not so thorough or far-reaching. However, he does distinguish clearly between the reality of personalities (ontological) and that of the world of nature about him (phenomenal). Also, Augustine has the concept of the ideality of time and gives it considerable study in his eleventh book of The Confessions. At times he is not quite sure of his observations, but if his statements are allowed to be carried to their logical implications and conclusions, he too had abolished the "two great phantoms of space and time". Personalism has con-

1. Knudson, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 202.
2. Ibid., p. 205.
3. Ibid., p. 178.
4. Eucken, R. The Problem of Human Life, p. 267.

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1. *Augustine, A. D. The Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 202.  
 2. *Ibid.*, p. 203.  
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 173.  
 4. *Augustine, A. D. The Problem of Human Life*, p. 267.



consistently held that the idea of space and time were altogether conceptual, and that this view is a striking corollary to the idea of the phenomenality of matter.

When considering the keystone in personalism's metaphysical arch, namely, that personality is the key to reality, we find in Augustine in marked agreement. In this respect at least, Augustine is far in advance of his day, and it is our observation that the whole development of his philosophy is in a pre-eminent degree an expression of personality and of the personal life. <sup>1</sup>"The command to 'know thyself' became for him the way to God." Reality is thus to be investigated and discovered only through personality.

In Augustine's view there is a vastness and a depth to the totality of personal being that is larger than the intellect. The hairs of man's head are easier to be numbered than are his feelings and aspirations. But withal, there is a self-certainty about the personal life that is affirmed, which provides for the only adequate answer to the questions of abstract thought regarding identity, change, one and many. The key to the ultimate <sup>ly</sup> real is to be found first and last for Augustine in man's own personal life. Within himself alone will he find the ladders that are long enough and strong enough to reach to abiding reality.

In building his thought of God, Augustine traces his struggle from Manichaeism (with its ethical dualism) to a scriptural view of the infinite personality. He shows how he learned

1. Harnack, A. The History of Dogma, Vol. V, p. 107.





from Neo-platonism that God was spiritual rather than spatial. However, in constructing his definite ideas about this Spiritual Being, he falls back on the Scriptures for his starting point. He finds there that man was made in the image of God, and from this he concludes that if man is like God then God must be like man. Man is not only from God, he is of God. This leads to the thought that God is a person. Once more we may say that Augustine was personalistic in his habits of thought.

Also, God is the Supreme Good, for Augustine, The idea of value or worth is pre-eminent here. God is better than the best than he can think of. However, Augustine is also careful to warn that God is more than he can think of, and advises that at most the Augustinian pictures of God are but seen as through a glass darkly.

Even in his view of the Trinity Augustine approaches the problem from the psychological point of view rather than the social. His emphasis is upon unity *of* consciousness rather than upon three distinct centers of consciousness. Once more he is in agreement with personalism. In fact, he tries to understand the Trinity through his own mental constitution and uses the latter as an analogue in that regard.

Augustine also maintains, despite his theological adventures, the simplicity of God - not the simplicity of shallowness, to be sure, but the simplicity of unity.

And finally, in considering the nature of Christ, Augustine attaches unique significance to the human element in

There is a co-existence that God was spiritual rather than material. However, in considering his doctrine about this spiritual being, he falls back on the doctrine of the spiritual point. He thinks there that man was made in the image of God and that this is the reason that if man is like God then God must be like man. Man is not only like God, he is of God. This is the thought that God is a person. Once more we say that spiritual is personally in the sense of thought. Also, God is the Supreme Good, for Augustine. The idea of value or worth is prominent here. God is better than the best that we can think of. However, Augustine is also careful to say that God is more than we can think of, and wishes that we could be admitted to his world of God and not even be through these things.

Even in his view of the Trinity, Augustine approaches the problem from the psychological point of view rather than the social. His emphasis is upon unity of consciousness rather than upon the distinctness of consciousness. Once more he is in agreement with personalism. In fact, he tries to understand the Trinity through his own mental constitution and uses the latter as an analogy in that regard. Augustine also maintains, despite his theological aversion, the simplicity of God - not the simplicity of shallow men, to be sure, but the simplicity of unity.

And finally, in considering the nature of Christ, Augustine attaches more significance to the human element in



his Master. He was the perfect man, and as such, was the Mediator and the Way.

Thus in Augustine's metaphysics, as we have endeavored to show in the foregoing, the ontologically real is to be found only in personality. This marks the emphatic footprint in Augustine's thought, and to a large degree the modern personalistic philosophy has had to retrace the same steps (whether wittingly or not) to reach its present position.

the subject. However the subject was, and in such, and the subject-  
after the law.  
There is a certain amount of confusion, and we have endeavored  
to show in this chapter, the importance of the subject to be treated  
only in general terms. This subject is extremely important in  
the subject of the subject, and is a subject of great importance  
which philosophy has not yet reached the same stage as other  
subjects (to say) to reach the present position.

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